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The attorney-client privilege is sacrosanct, but its protections are eroding.
Always narrowly construed, its zone of protection is becoming even
smaller, particularly for in-house counsel. This is due to organizations’
inability to address the impact that technological innovations have had on
the privilege. In many instances, new and disruptive technologies are
assaulting the privilege as a result of unsuspecting corporate practices.
This Article details how technology advancements coupled with
heightened judicial scrutiny have chipped away at the protections the
privilege affords to internal counsel. The historical basis for increased
court scrutiny of in-house counsel’s privilege claims is detailed. With
respect to technology, e-mail is spotlighted as a principal causation
element in this process. 1 In addition, the Article explores how social
networking sites, cloud computing, and corporate “bring your own
device” policies all have the potential to undermine the privilege
assertions of in-house counsel. Finally, some best practices are discussed
which, if followed, can help prevent further erosions to such claims.
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1

See Tom Spahn, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in the Digital Age: War on Two
Fronts?, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 288, 293 (2011).
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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Technology has certainly been a game-changer for the attorneyclient relationship. 2 In particular, digital age innovations have facilitated
communication between organizations and their lawyers. 3
While
messaging was previously limited to traditional options such as telephone
calls, paper letters, and facsimiles, 4 lawyers and clients now enjoy an
abundance of media through which they can instantaneously exchange
information. 5 Besides e-mail, 6 companies and counsel now trade

2

See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a
Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 674-75 (2010) (arguing that technology can facilitate
compliance and present “catastrophic dangers” in the financial services industry).
3

See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798 (E.D. La. 2007) (detailing
the role of e-mail in facilitating the communication process between lawyer and client).

4

Ben Delsa, E-mail and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Simple E-mail in Confidence, 59
LA. L. REV. 935, 935-36 (1999) (“Unlike telephone calls, e-mail creates written records
of communications, and allows users to send large documents and images by attaching
them to the e-mail message . . . [and] avoids ‘telephone tag’ . . . . In contrast to facsimile
transmission, e-mail can send information directly from a computer in a form that the
recipient can edit and return . . . [and] costs less than a fax, especially when used for
interstate or international communication.”).
5

See id. at 935 (attributing the widespread use of e-mail to “its unique advantages over
other forms of communication. E-mail documents cost less to store, can be edited and
efficiently searched, and can disseminate information to several destinations at once.”).
6

See Harry M. Gruber, E-mail: The Attorney-Client Privilege Applied, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 624, 626-27 (1998) (noting, in 1998, that many lawyers were already relying on email as a form of communication with clients); Gil Keteltas & John Rosenthal, Discovery
of Electronic Evidence, in ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 4 (2d ed. 2008)
(“E-mails have replaced other forms of communication besides just paper-based
communication. Many informal messages that were previously relayed by telephone or
at the water cooler are now sent via e-mail.” (quoting Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C
8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9861, at *32 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002))).
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messages through short message service, 7 instant messages, social
networking sites, 8 and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP). 9 The methods
for doing so have also expanded, with small form factor (SFF) devices
such as smartphones and tablet computers replacing desktop computers
and other antiquated tools. 10 And with the proliferation of cloud
computing, both client and counsel essentially have an unlimited virtual
warehouse in which to store their digital discussions. 11
[2]
Yet these same technological innovations also present a myriad of
complications for the lawyer-client relationship. 12 For example, such
7

See, e.g., Laura M. Holson, Text Messages: Digital Lipstick on the Collar, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/us/09text.html (discussing the role of text
messages in family law).

8

Social media communications are requested for production at least forty-one percent of
the time. Press Release, Symantec, Symantec Survey Finds Emails are No Longer the
Most Commonly Specified Documents in eDiscovery Requests (Sept. 19, 2011),
available at www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20110918_01.

9

See Robert Hardaway et al., E-Discovery’s Threat to Civil Litigation: Reevaluating Rule
26 for the Digital Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 553-54 (2011) (noting that some
organizations have begun recording a variety of audio communications).
10

See Pedro Pavon, Risky Business: “Bring-Your-Own-Device” and Your Company,
BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2013, at 1, 1-3 available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2013/09/01_pavon.html; David J. Walton,
‘Bring Your Own Device’ to Work Carries Data Security Risks, LAW TECH. NEWS (Sept.
6, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202570405609
(highlighting data security as a primary BYOD risk, especially when personal cloud
storage is involved).
11

See William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1200 (2010).

12

See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011)
(discussing the challenges of maintaining confidentiality in electronic communications),
available at

3
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technologies and others have opened the proverbial floodgates of
electronically stored information (“ESI”). This deluge of ESI has
inundated the electronic information systems of enterprises and law firms,
creating complexity for both client and counsel in establishing effective
information retention and discovery response strategies. 13
[3]
Another such challenge arises from the ability that third parties
now have to mine metadata from various software applications.14
Metadata—the embedded text that provides key details about the nature of
ESI—is a powerful tool for understanding the who, what, when, and
where of a particular document. However, unless appropriate precautions
are taken, metadata also poses a technological trap as confidential client
information could be exposed to the other side. 15
[4]
Despite the significance of these and other issues, they are
secondary to the impact that technology has unintentionally had on the
attorney-client privilege (“privilege”). 16 As both a procedural rule and an
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
11_459_nm_formal_opinion.authcheckdam.pdf.
13

See generally Philip J. Favro, Sea Change or Status Quo: Has The Rule 37(e) Safe
Harbor Advanced Best Practices for Records Management?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
317 (2010) (detailing the data governance challenges that organizations face from the
information explosion).
14

Adjoa Linzy, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Discovery of Electronically Stored
Information, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, ¶¶ 15, 33-38 (2011) (detailing, among other
things, the logistical challenges that metadata poses for maintaining the privileged nature
of communications between client and counsel).
15

See Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining
Metadata, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 4-5, 7-10 (2007) (discussing the nature,
significance, and hazards of metadata).
16

See Acosta v. Target Corp., No. 05 C 7068, 281 F.R.D. 314, 322 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(observing that “[t]he complications in analyzing the attorney-client privilege for a
corporation have been multiplied by the advent of ESI.”).

4
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evidentiary hurdle that excludes relevant information from legal
proceedings, strong policy reasons have traditionally mandated that the
privilege be narrowly construed. 17 That limited scope of protection
continues to shrink as technologies provide unexpected transparency into
the zone of confidential exchanges between clients and lawyers. 18
[5]
The phenomenon of increased transparency has had a far greater
impact on the privilege claims of in-house counsel than on outside
counsel. 19 This is because courts already scrutinize in-house privilege
claims to a greater degree than those of their outside counterparts. 20
Given the dual roles that internal counsel typically have as both legal and
business advisors for their client organizations, courts now apply
heightened scrutiny to their privilege assertions to ensure that only legal
advice is shielded from disclosure. 21 Courts have justified such disparate
treatment as necessary to more readily detect whether companies are
17

See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc. (Oracle I), No. C-10-03561-WHA DMR, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011) (citing Vasudevan Software v.
IBM Corp., No. 09-5897-RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47764 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27,
2011)) aff’d, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20,
2011), aff’d, In re Google Inc., 462 Fed. Appx. 975, 977-78 (Fed. Circ. 2012).
18

See discussion infra Parts III and IV.

19

See B.F.G. of Ill., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99-C-4604, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18930, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001) (criticizing the defendants’ “use of in-house
counsel to give a veneer of privilege to otherwise non-privileged business
communications”).
20

See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1721, 1727 (2005) (“In practice, however, courts tend to apply more scrutiny to
communication with in-house counsel . . .”); Todd Presnell, A Higher Standard Claiming
Attorney-Client Privilege Is Tougher for In-House Counsel, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June
2005, at 19, 21-23 (“Nevertheless, in-house lawyers will receive greater scrutiny from
courts . . . when they attempt to invoke the attorney-client privilege”).
21

See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a clear
showing was required to establish the privilege since the company general counsel also
had “certain responsibilities outside the lawyer’s sphere”).

5
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trying to inoculate ordinary business records from discovery by funneling
them through their in-house lawyers. Indeed, judicial concern over such a
“zone of silence” in discovery is one of the principal reasons why the
privilege assertions of in-house lawyers are handled so differently. 22 That
scrutiny, however, has become further magnified as new and disruptive
technologies 23 have removed the veneer of confidentiality from messages
that, rightly or wrongly, would have been immune from discovery in the
halcyon days of analog communications. 24 E-mail is perhaps the most
glaring example of this development.
[6]
E-mail is a helpful yet particularly troublesome innovation
because it provides a written record of internal corporate discussions
involving counsel that, until recently, did not exist. 25 Those messages—
which reflect legal counsel, business advice, 26 or both—are often in play
during litigation due to the inclusion of counsel on non-privileged e-

22

See David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE
L.J. 953, 955 (1956) (warning that overreaching privilege claims could result in a “zone
of silence” in which non-privileged documents are improperly withheld from discovery).
23

See Spahn, supra note 1, at 293 (“The advent of electronic communications has greatly
complicated the application of the attorney-client privilege, particularly for in-house
counsel”).

24

See PAUL RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 250-51 (2d ed. 2008)
(describing some differences between traditional written communication and e-mail).
25

See United States v. Segal, No. 02–CR–112, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, at *9 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 16, 2004) (observing that “the rise of e-mail as the primary mode of corporate
communication permits the broad dissemination and near-complete documentation of
corporate communications,” which has forced additional complexity into the analysis of
privilege claims involving corporate counsel).
26

See Mac-Ray Corp. v. Ricotta, No. 03–CV–524S(F), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32023, at
*8 (W.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004) (holding that no privilege attached to various internal emails involving “routine business transactions” sent to corporate counsel for “review and
approval”).

6
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mails, 27 tactically sanitized privilege logs, 28 and undetected draft emails. 29 These features of e-mail all serve to undermine counsel’s
privilege assertions. 30
[7]
A quintessential example of the havoc that e-mail has wrought on
such assertions is found in the recent Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.
litigation. In that case, Google withheld a so-called “smoking gun” e-mail
as privileged because it was directed to an internal company lawyer. 31
Prior to the digital age, such a straightforward privilege claim may have
been left unchallenged given the scant information typically required for a
privilege log. 32 Nevertheless, various drafts of that same e-mail,
27

See Sasha Danna, The Impact of Electronic Discovery on Privilege and the
Applicability of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1683,
1697 (2005) (“[C]ourts have regarded with particular skepticism claims that e-mail
messages are subject to the attorney-client privilege because they have either been copied
or forwarded to in-house counsel.”).
28

See B.F.G. of Ill., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99-C-4604, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18930, at *18-19 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001) (holding that certain e-mails involving inhouse counsel were not privileged and criticizing the defendants’ efforts to improperly
“shield” those communications from discovery in their privilege log).
29

Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99-C-8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9861, at *32 (N.D.
Ill. June 3, 2002) (“[C]omputers have the ability to capture several copies (or drafts) of
the same e-mail, thus multiplying the volume of documents. All of these e-mails must be
scanned for both relevance and privilege.”).
30

Gopal S. Patel, Note, E-mail Communication and the Attorney-Client Privilege: An
Ethical Quagmire, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 685, 685 (2004) (“[E]-mail [] has made
attorney-client contact communication much cheaper and easier. However, this benefit
comes with a significant cost. The information that is passed on through this method of
communication can be rather easily intercepted or inadvertently disclosed. These
technological advancements pose very unique challenges to both attorneys and judges.”).
31

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle II), No. C-10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S Dist.
LEXIS 121446, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011).
32

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).

7
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mistakenly produced by Google, indicated that the sender actually sought
business advice from a company executive and not legal advice from inhouse counsel. 33 As a result, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling that applied heightened
scrutiny34 and found that the e-mail was not privileged despite the
presence of counsel. 35
[8]
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Oracle represents a troubling body
of jurisprudence for organizations that are trying to protect the privilege
claims of their corporate counsel in the face of e-mail complications. 36
Worse, however, is that this problem is not limited to e-mail. 37 New
technologies and related trends could also prove disruptive to these claims.
[9]
By way of example, social networking sites are an increasingly
popular communication medium in many industry verticals, including the
legal profession. While many lawyers use these sites to market their
services, others—including in-house lawyers—are using them to discuss
legal matters with clients. 38 While certain communication functionality
33

In re Google Inc. (Oracle III), 462 F. App’x 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

34

Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *7.

35

Oracle III, 462 F. App’x at 977-78.

36

See Jan Conlin & Andrew Pieper, Litigation: Keeping that Corporate Privilege,
INSIDECOUNSEL (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/09/27/litigationkeeping-that-corporate-privilege (“[I]f In re Google is any predictor, a party claiming
privilege needs to make a ‘clear showing’ that the involved communication relates to inhouse counsel working in her capacity as an attorney.”).
37

See Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning—Professional
Ethics at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 145-146 (2011)
(discussing the multiplicity of discovery challenges involving technologies, including text
messages, Facebook postings, and cloud data storage).
38

See, e.g., Social Media, 10-8 PARTNER'S REP., Aug. 2010, at 10, 12 (“[Seventy] percent
of in[-]house lawyers between the ages of [thirty] and [thirty-nine] had used Facebook for

8
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provided by social networks may look like e-mail, 39 that functionality
could lack the necessary confidentiality to shield otherwise privileged
discussions from discovery. This includes the ostensibly “private”
messaging features available on some sites, which may be accessible to
site representatives. 40
[10] Confidentiality could also become problematic where cloud
computing is used to store the communications involving in-house
counsel. Despite being the in vogue repository for ESI, cloud service
providers are third parties whose access to stored privileged messages
could very well vitiate the required element of confidentiality. 41 While
this issue is not insurmountable for providers, it is a valid consideration
since many offerings provide their employees with unfettered access to
customer data. 42 Unless appropriate safeguards are designed to preserve
the confidentiality of such communications, in-house privilege claims may
be waived.
[11] New workplace practices such as “bring your own device”
(“BYOD”) policies, which are designed for employee convenience and
personal reasons in the previous [twenty-four] hours and that [fifty] percent had used it
for professional reasons in the previous week.”).
39

Cf. Nicholas Carlson & Kamelia Angelova, CHART OF THE DAY: Email’s Reign is
Over, Social Networking is the New King, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2010, 4:11 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-social-networking-vs-email-usage2010-4 (showing that social media usage has exceeded e-mail use since 2007).
40

See discussion infra Part IV.A.

41

See CARLA R. WALWORTH ET AL., PRIVILEGE LAW, ITS GLOBAL APPLICATION, AND THE
IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 8-10 (2012), available at
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/young_lawyer/attorneyclientprivileg
e.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing recent case law regarding discovery and privilege on
cloud and social media platforms).
40

See discussion infra Part IV.B.

9
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employer cost savings, could also present a host of inconvenient and
costly problems for in-house privilege claims. 43 This is because BYOD
may cause companies to cede a significant aspect of control from
employer to employee. 44 Without layering in adequate protections, that
lack of control could jeopardize confidentiality if employees use personal
cloud storage platforms for the transmission or storage of company data.45
In addition, confidentiality could be compromised depending on the nature
of access that the employee’s family and friends have to the device. 46
[12] In summary, heightened scrutiny and technological innovations are
inviting further judicial probing of internal counsel’s privilege claims. In
this Article, I review these phenomena, the challenges they pose for
establishing the defensibility of in-house privilege claims, and actionable
insights for doing so. In Part II, I provide an overview of the privilege and
detail through both jurisprudence and legal scholarship the increased
scrutiny that courts apply to such claims. Part III analyzes a series of
cases that describe how the proliferation of e-mail has caused a
corresponding rise in judicial scrutiny toward in-house privilege
assertions. Part IV delves into the common yet respective problems that
social networks, cloud computing, and BYOD present for such assertions.
In Part V, I offer some actionable suggestions for addressing the foregoing
problems.
43

Cf. Pragati Jain, BYOD: Bring Your Own Device . . . or Disaster? MAASTERS CENTER
(July 20, 2012), www.maas360.com/maasters/blog/trendsandtechnology/byod-bringyour-own-device-disaster/ (noting concerns created by BYOD programs, including data
security and the ease of accessibility for non-employees).
44

See Stephen S. Wu, Managing an Enterprise Mobile Device Program, THE CORP.
COUNS. NEWSL., Feb. 1, 2013,
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_corpcounselor/27_2/news/1576971.html.
45

See discussion infra Part IV.C.

46

See id.
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THE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY APPLIED TO IN-HOUSE
COUNSEL’S PRIVILEGE CLAIMS

[13] To grasp how technology is inviting greater scrutiny of the
privilege claims of internal counsel, it is important to understand the shift
in traditional judicial thinking regarding such claims. The trend of
heightened scrutiny toward those assertions is now firmly established in
American jurisprudence, though it may come as a surprise that things were
not always this way. Indeed, prior to 1984, in-house lawyers’ privilege
claims were generally treated with the same level of scrutiny as those of
their law firm counterparts, despite their multifaceted roles as legal
counselor and business advisor. 47
[14] That doctrine was memorialized in the seminal 1950 opinion of
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 48 and was consistently
followed for most of the next three decades. The sea change on this issue
arrived in 1984 with the issuance of In re Sealed Case by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 49 From that time, courts
steadily incorporated then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s reasoning that a
clear showing is required to establish the bona fides of in-house counsel’s
privilege claims. 50 In fact, such a standard is now the unqualified majority
rule. 51

47

See discussion infra Part II.C.

48

United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).

49

In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 98-9 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

50

Id. at 101.

51

See PAUL R. RICE, 2 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES §7:2 (2d.
ed. 2010).
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[15] In this Part, I analyze the shifting judicial approach to in-house
privilege claims, beginning with an overview of the privilege, its purposes,
and the scope of this exclusionary rule. Included in this discussion is an
analysis of the disparate treatment currently applied to such in-house
claims as opposed to those of firm lawyers. I next describe the historical
evolution of the “clear showing” rule. Starting with United Shoe, I follow
the progression of the rule through Sealed Case and then detail how the
clear showing standard has permeated contemporary jurisprudence. I
conclude this Part by briefly introducing the correlation between
technology and the increasing scrutiny that courts apply to internal
lawyers’ claims.
A. The Privilege—Purposes, Policy and Scope
[16] The privilege certainly has achieved a venerated status in the
United States. Hailed as one of the lynchpins of the adversary system, it
has been called everything from “sacred” 52 and “sacrosanct” 53 to
“essential” 54 and “compellingly important.” 55 The U.S. Supreme Court
has repeatedly defended the privilege and its purpose of ensuring “full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients,” declaring it to
be critical to the “administration of justice.” 56 Moreover, the concept of
privilege has transcended the legal profession and permeated popular
52

SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 680 (D.D.C. 1981).

53

Morgan v. Montanye, 521 F.2d 693, 693 (2d Cir. 1975).

54

In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947)).

55

Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (W.D. Mich.
1966).
56

Upjohn Corp. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (observing that the “purpose”
of the privilege is “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”).

12
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culture. 57 Over the decades, movies, television, and literature have
touched on the scope, impact, and need for the privilege. 58
[17] To be sure, not all commentary about the privilege has been
positive or laudatory. 59 The privilege has been criticized for its obvious
exclusionary results, 60 for where the privilege applies, relevant evidence is
excluded from proceedings. 61 Given these zero-sum consequences, some
have even argued that the scope of the privilege should be severely
curtailed or even eliminated to better ensure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of legal proceedings. 62
57

See Michael Asimow & Richard Weisberg, When the Lawyer Knows the Client Is
Guilty: Client Confessions in Legal Ethics, Popular Culture, and Literature, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 229, 248-52 (2009) (discussing the attorney-client privilege in popular
culture and literature).
58

See, e.g., movieclips, The Lincoln Lawyer (7/11) Movie Clip – Attorney-Client
Privilege (2011) HD, YOUTUBE (May 17, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lfCVS3HWdjg; CBS, The Good Wife – Attorney
Client Privilege, MOVIEWEB (Mar. 24, 2013),
http://www.movieweb.com/tv/TEmV1ZDHjFAiqp/attorney-client-privilege.
59

See Note, Functional Overlap Between The Lawyer And Other Professionals: Its
Implications For The Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L. J. 1226, 1236-37
(1962) [hereinafter Functional Overlap] (discussing criticisms of the privilege and
commentators who have sought to limit its application).
60

See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege For Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test,
84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 425-26 (1970) [hereinafter The Control Group Test] (noting the
obvious exclusionary results that the privilege causes in discovery).
61

See Lory A. Barsdate, Attorney-Client Privilege For The Government Entity, 97 YALE.
L. J. 1725, 1729 (1988) (discussing how the privilege prevents the presentation of
relevant evidence to a jury).
62

See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 446 (1982) (observing that the privilege’s “staunchest
proponents concede that, whenever the privilege is invoked, otherwise relevant and
admissible evidence may be suppressed . . . . [and] potentially hinders the administration
of justice.”).
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[18] To balance these valid yet countervailing considerations, courts
have been directed to carefully examine all of the circumstances
surrounding a privilege claim. 63 To enable this result and to eliminate the
possibility that courts could get locked into rigid procedural requirements,
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 directs courts to evaluate privilege
assertions based on existing common law principles. 64 Indeed, nearly four
decades ago, Congress declined to codify the privilege, ostensibly so that
courts would have the necessary flexibility to adjudicate matters of
privilege. 65 The rationale supporting the congressional rejection of a
codified privilege rule has been ratified time and again by the Supreme
Court, which has likewise urged trial courts to assess privilege claims on a
case-by-case basis and not through fixed presuppositions.66
B. The Disparate Treatment of In-house Counsel’s Privilege
Claims
[19] Despite such direction from Congress and the Court, lower courts
have nonetheless developed a framework to help evaluate whether a
particular claim meets the requirements of the privilege. 67 Under that
63

See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47-48 (1980) (explaining that a privilege
analysis requires courts to eschew rigid guidelines given changing cultural norms and the
factually intensive nature of such claims).

64

FED. R. EVID. 501.

65

See generally United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980) (discussing proposed
drafts of Rule 501 from 1973 and noting that “Congress substituted the present language
of Rule 501 for the draft proposed by the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference
of the United States to provide the courts with greater flexibility in developing rules of
privilege on a case-by-case basis”).
66

See, e.g., id.

67

See, e.g., Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16418, at
*20-21 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012), modified No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46274 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) (discussing the factors which generally justify the
application of the clear showing rule to in-house counsel’s privilege claims).
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common law rubric, the elements of the privilege—a confidential
communication between the client and the lawyer made for the purpose of
obtaining a legal opinion or advice—are generally applied unequally to inhouse lawyers as opposed to outside counsel. 68 While retained lawyers
are accorded a basic presumption of privilege for their communications,69
in-house attorneys enjoy no such presumption. 70 On the contrary, their
claims are heavily scrutinized to ensure that an organizational client is not
hiding business advice or other non-legal considerations under the cloak of
privilege. 71 The Diversified Industries v. Meredith 72 and United States v.
Chevron Corp. 73 cases are particularly instructive and representative on
the current levels of scrutiny applied to the privilege claims of firm
lawyers as opposed to corporate counsel.
[20] In Diversified Industries, the Eighth Circuit held en banc that
communications between a manufacturing company’s employees and the
company’s retained law firm were protected by the privilege. 74 At issue
was whether those discussions were privileged since a three-judge panel
previously determined that the law firm was not retained “to provide legal

68

See id.

69

See United States, ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv-1002Orl-31TBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944, *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012) (observing that
messages “between corporate client and outside litigation counsel are cloaked with a
presumption of privilege”).
70

See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798 (E.D. La. 2007).

71

See id. at 798-799.

72

Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601-03 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).

73

United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C 94–1885 SBA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8646, at
*3-8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996).
74

Diversified, 572 F.2d at 606-07, 610-11.
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services or advice.” 75 The en banc panel rejected that decision, finding
instead that the manufacturer engaged the law firm to provide legal advice
relating to its investigation of alleged internal corruption. 76 Central to the
court’s holding was its reasoning that the firm was a “professional legal
adviser.” 77 Given the firm’s status as outside counsel, the court articulated
a presumption that such communications were generally privileged:
“Here, the matter was committed to Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, a
professional legal adviser. Thus, it was prima facie committed for the sake
of legal advice and was, therefore, within the privilege absent a clear
showing to the contrary.” 78 This presumption was essential to the en banc
panel’s opposite conclusion regarding the manufacturer’s claim of
privilege. 79
[21] In contrast to the favorable finding for outside counsel in
Diversified, the holding from United States v. Chevron Corp. came down
squarely against such a presumption for internal lawyers. 80 In Chevron,
the district court vacated a magistrate judge’s findings that protected
scores of communications involving the defendant petroleum company’s
in-house counsel as privileged. 81 The court was particularly troubled that
75

Id. at 603, 606.

76

Id. at 610.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Diversified, 572 F.2d at 610-11; see also United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241
F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (reciting the general rule that a
“[c]ommunication between a client and its outside counsel are presumed to be made for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice.” (citing Diversified, 572 F.2d 596)).

80

United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C–94–1885 SBA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4154, at
*9-10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996), modified, No. C–94–1885 SBA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8646 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 1996); cf. Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
81

Chevron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4154 at *11.
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the magistrate “presumed” that messages involving corporate counsel
were privileged. 82 Relying on Diversified, the court reasoned that such a
presumption was appropriate for outside counsel. 83 Nevertheless, the
court did not extend the benefit of the doubt to in-house counsel, noting
counsel’s inextricable involvement in corporate business matters. 84 To
ensure that only legal and not business advice was protected from
discovery, the company needed to “make a clear showing that in-house
counsel’s advice was given in a professional legal capacity.” 85
[22] The Diversified and Chevron Corp. cases exemplify how
differently the judiciary views counsel’s respective privilege claims. For
outside counsel, the privilege applies “absent a clear showing to the
contrary.” 86 But for in-house lawyers, the privilege does not attach unless
a clear showing is made to justify the claim. This stark divergence in
treatment has been criticized as an inappropriate deviation from the
congressional mandate regarding privilege assertions. 87 It is also
somewhat surprising given that most courts take pains to clarify that the
clear showing standard for in-house attorneys does not dilute their status

82

Id. at *9.

83

Id.at *8-9 (citing Diversified, 572 F.2d at 610).

84

Chevron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4154, at *9-10.

85

Id. The matter was eventually remanded to the magistrate judge with the direction that
he make findings consistent with the district court’s order. Id.; see also United States v.
Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (observing that “the
presumption that attaches to communications with outside counsel does not extend to
communications with in-house counsel.” (citing Chevron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4154, at *8-11)).
86

Diversified, 572 F.2d at 610.

87

See, e.g., Amy L. Weiss, In-house Counsel Beware: Wearing The Business Hat Could
Mean Losing The Privilege, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 393-94 (1998) (criticizing the
trend of heightened scrutiny caused by the clear showing rule).
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as professional legal advisors. 88 And yet, such a standard has had
precisely the effect of weakening in-house privilege claims since it was
first articulated in Sealed Case in 1984. 89
[23] To understand how courts have justified the application of a more
probing legal framework for analyzing such privilege assertions, it is
worth examining the historical evolution of the clear showing rule through
the lens of jurisprudence. A review of pertinent scholarship is also
insightful, particularly since the seeds of heightened scrutiny were sown in
a remarkably prescient article published by the Yale Law Journal shortly
after the United Shoe case. 90
C. From Presumptively Privileged to Heightened Scrutiny:
How the Judiciary Arrived at the Clear Showing Rule and Its
Impact on In-house Counsel
1. The Comparable Treatment of Lawyers’ Privilege
Claims Under United Shoe
[24] Once upon a time, the privilege claims of in-house lawyers were
treated in the same manner as those of their law firm colleagues. Despite
differences in the sources of their compensation, employment status, and
the nature of their respective clients, courts considered the respective
claims of internal and external lawyers to be equivalent since they were
each deemed “professional legal advisors.” No case better encapsulates

88

See Neuberger Berman Real Estate Income Fund, Inc. v. Lola Brown Trust, No. AMD04-3056, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19513, at *39 n.20 (D. Md. 2005) (explaining the
dichotomy between courts’ stated intentions to not weaken the privilege and their
continued application of heightened scrutiny to house privilege claims).
89

See discussion infra Part II.D.

90

See Simon, supra note 22; discussion infra Part II.C.2.
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that former trend than the United Shoe decision. 91 Authored by the
venerable jurist Charles Wyzanski, United Shoe was the leading case for
decades on the privilege. 92 Particularly noteworthy is Judge Wyzanski’s
analysis regarding the comparable treatment for the privilege assertions of
outside counsel and internal lawyers. 93
[25] In United Shoe, the court was asked to determine whether
approximately 800 documents belonging to the defendant company were
privileged. 94 The documents included communications between company
employees and the company’s retained outside counsel, along with
internal discussions involving the company’s in-house legal advisors. 95 In
ruling that both categories of documents were generally privileged, 96 the
court observed that the claims of in-house lawyers were comparable to
those of their law firm counterparts since each was a professional legal
advisor:
[T]he apparent factual differences between these house counsel
and outside counsel are . . . not sufficient differences to

91

United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).

92

See, e.g., In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 420 (2nd Cir. 2007) (opining that certain
of Judge Wyzanski’s observations regarding the privilege apply “with equal force
today”).

93

See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 360.

94

Id. at 358.

95

See id. at 359. The court also considered whether communications involving the
company’s patent agents should be privileged. The court declined to do so. This aspect
of the holding from United Shoe has been rejected in subsequent jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (summarizing criticism of the United Shoe holding that did not extend the
privilege to patent agents).
96

Id. at 359-360.
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distinguish the two types of counsel for purposes of the attorneyclient privilege . . . . The type of service performed by house
counsel is substantially like that performed by many members of
the large urban law firms. The distinction is chiefly that the
house counsel gives advice to one regular client, the outside
counsel to several regular clients. 97

Thus, the court did not make the distinction between outside and in-house
counsel that has now become the norm in a post-Sealed Case world.
[26] However, in the most critical aspect of its opinion, the court also
reasoned that a privilege claim should not be vitiated by the presence of
related business advice in a communication containing legal counsel. 98
Observing that the “modern lawyer” was often forced to deal with nonlegal considerations, the court opined that “the privilege of nondisclosure
is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly
stated in a communication which also includes legal advice.” 99 The lone
note the court offered in this regard was that a lawyer’s communication
involving just business advice would not be privileged. 100
[27] The rule from United Shoe that the privilege claims of in-house
counsel were on par with those of outside lawyers instantly became an
97

Id. at 360 (emphasis added).

98

See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359. While this explanation was provided in the
context of outside counsel, it was subsequently applied with equal force to in-house
counsel. See, e.g., Chore-Time Equip. Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020,
1022 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (explaining that “Judge Wyzanski was also referring to house
counsel when he said the privilege should not be lost merely because an attorney includes
non-legal advice with legal advice”).
99

United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359.

100

See id. (“Where a communication neither invited nor expressed any legal opinion
whatsoever, but involved the mere soliciting or giving of business advice, it is not
privileged” (citing United States v. Vehicular Parking, 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943)).
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accepted principle. It would endure for the next thirty-plus years as courts
and scholarship generally acknowledged the comparative status of
lawyers’ privilege claims, irrespective of their employer. 101 Nevertheless,
the more important notion from United Shoe was Judge Wyzanski’s dicta
regarding the privileged status of communications that included non-legal
advice. 102 While initially accepted as a prevailing rule, such mixed
purpose messages would come under scrutiny in the 1970s and ultimately
prove the undoing of the equal status of in-house counsel’s privilege
claims. 103
2. The United Shoe Rule Versus Corporate Zones of
Silence
[28] A few years after the United Shoe opinion was decided, the Yale
Law Journal published an insightful article analyzing the impact of United
Shoe on the privilege claims of corporations. 104 Recognizing that this
aspect of privilege law was still in its nascent stage, author David Simon
examined various scenarios relating to the scope and application of the
privilege to organizations. Among the issues considered in the article was
whether the privilege claims of internal counsel should be accorded equal
status with those of external lawyers. 105
[29] Simon agreed with the United Shoe principle that corporate
lawyers’ claims should receive similar privilege protection as those of firm
lawyers. 106 Nevertheless, he also observed that the privilege might have
101

See discussion infra Part II.C.3.a.

102

See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359.

103

See discussion infra Part II.C.3.b.

104

See generally Simon, supra note 22.

105

See id. at 973.

106

See id. at 970.
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to yield in certain instances, particularly “in a case where too much
valuable evidence would be insulated by the privilege being accorded to
house counsel . . . .” 107 Simon theorized that the “physical proximity of
house counsel” to corporate employees could make it relatively easy to
convert counsel from a legal advisor into a “privileged sanctuary for
corporate records.” 108 Simon noted that in such a circumstance, courts
would most likely force in-house counsel to acquiesce the protections of
the privilege to prevent a “zone of silence” from insulating ordinary
corporate business activities from discovery. 109
[30] Simon’s views regarding the privilege claims of in-house attorneys
have proven visionary. In post-Sealed Case jurisprudence, courts
applying the clear showing rule have repeatedly recognized that
companies frequently yield to the temptation to use their internal lawyers
as a privilege “sanctuary” given their proximity to corporate records.110
Many of these cases have involved e-mail and have spotlighted how the
virtual proximity of counsel through a “cc,” “forward,” or “reply” has
resulted in organizations withholding from discovery communications that
otherwise lack any indicia of privilege. 111

107

Id. at 973.

108

Id.

109

See Simon, supra note 22, at 955-56 (“Where corporations are involved, with their
large number of agents, masses of documents, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the
zone of silence grows large. Few judges—or legislators either, for that matter—would
long tolerate any common law privilege that allowed corporations to insulate all their
activities by discussing them with legal advisers. It is this risk, and this challenge, that
underlie a number of attorney-client privilege problems peculiar to corporations.”).
110

See discussion infra Part II.D.

111

See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
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3. The United Shoe Rule Followed for the Next Three
Decades
[31] Despite Simon’s prescient predictions, the holding from United
Shoe would remain the majority rule on the treatment of in-house
counsel’s privilege assertions for the next three decades. During the 1950s
and 1960s, there was little disagreement as courts and scholarship
faithfully adhered to the United Shoe rule. 112 It was not until the 1970s
that the winds of change would begin to blow through the judiciary on this
issue. During those years, courts and commentators expanded on the
reasoning from United Shoe and began marking differences between
outside counsel and in-house lawyers. 113 These opinions would eventually
culminate in the issuance of the clear showing rule by the 1984 Sealed
Case decision. 114
a. The 1950s and 1960s: The United Shoe Rule at
Its Zenith
[32] The United Shoe rule was certainly at its zenith during the 1950s
and the 1960s. 115 In the spirit of United Shoe, the cases that examined the
viability of corporate privilege claims typically gave great deference to inhouse counsel. Indeed, while acknowledging that communications that

112

See discussion infra Part II.C.3.a.

113

See discussion infra Part II.C.3.b.

114

See discussion infra Part II.C.4.

115

Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (W.D. Mich.
1966) (citing United Shoe for the proposition that there is little difference between a
house counsel and an independent counsel. (United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950)).
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just involved “business advice” would not be privileged, 116 the judiciary
invariably sided with companies that invoked the privilege on behalf of
their in-house lawyers. 117
[33] For example, in Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States
Plywood Corp., the court explained that counsel’s status as an in-house
lawyer was the professional equivalent of the status held by outside
lawyers. 118 As a result, and despite acknowledging that much of counsel’s
work was “undoubtedly non-legal,” counsel’s discussions were
nonetheless deemed to be privileged. 119 In so doing, the court essentially
ratified Judge Wyzanski’s dicta that mixed purpose communications
should ultimately retain their privileged character. 120
[34] A similar result occurred in Paper Converting Machine Co. v.
FMC Corp., which held that several internal company discussions
involving the defendant’s “corporation patent counsel” were privileged. 121
While certain of those communications appeared to include non-legal
considerations, the apparent predominance of legal advice tipped the
scales in favor of the defendant’s privilege claims. 122
116

Lowy v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 262 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that
the privilege did not apply since counsel and the defendant were engaged in a “business
dealing” and not a legal matter).

117

See, e.g., Ga.-Pac. Plywood Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 465-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
118

Id. at 464.

119

Id. at 464-65.

120

Id.; accord United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 360.

121

Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp. 249, 251 (E.D. Wis. 1963).

122

Id. at 251–52.
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[35] Likewise in Natta v. Hogan, the Tenth Circuit reversed a
production order that would have divulged a privileged message involving
one of the defendant’s corporate lawyers. 123 Relying on United Shoe, the
Natta court reasoned that the defendant was equally entitled to assert the
privilege to prevent the discovery of communications involving its house
lawyers as it would to protect those of its outside counsel. 124
[36] The embrace of the United Shoe rule during the 1950s and 1960s is
perhaps best captured by a 1962 comment from the Yale Law Journal. 125
In that comment, the author cited to United Shoe for the proposition that
the privilege claims of in-house lawyers should not be defeated due to the
inclusion of business advice in a particular communication. 126 Parroting
Judge Wyzanski’s reasoning from United Shoe, 127 the author noted that
the privilege applied so long as the communication was arguably focused
on legal issues. 128 To do otherwise might jeopardize the privilege: “If the
attorney-client privilege is to retain vitality, it must not be withdrawn from
the attorney who acts in the joint capacity of lawyer and business
adviser.” 129

123

Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692–94 (10th Cir. 1968).

124

Id. at 692.

125

Functional Overlap, supra note 59, at 1250.

126

Id. at 1250.

127

Id. at 1250 n.164.

128

Id. at 1250.

129

Id.

25

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 1

b. The 1970s: Transitioning from United Shoe to
Sealed Case
[37] The majority rule status of the United Shoe doctrine began to
waver somewhat during the 1970s. While many judges still followed the
rule, some commentators and courts began to challenge Judge Wyzanski’s
dicta regarding mixed purpose communications. The result of these
contrary views was a weakening of the protections afforded to corporate
privilege claims. During this time of transition, scholarship and court
decisions implicitly channeled the privilege “sanctuary” and “zone of
silence” warnings to more carefully scrutinize such claims.
[38] This shifting trend is captured by a 1970 comment in the Harvard
Law Review. 130 In that comment, the author argued that various factors
justified the application of greater scrutiny to the privilege claims of
corporate counsel. 131 Invoking the privilege “sanctuary” and “zone of
silence” themes, the author warned that companies could be directing a
significant amount of non-privileged information through their internal
lawyers to immunize it from discovery. 132 Because much of that
information focused on “general business purposes” where legal advice
was not a predominant subject, the author cautioned courts against
sustaining such privilege assertions. 133
[39] The Harvard Law Review comment is significant because it points
to a shift in attitude regarding the nebulous area where legal and business
advice are intertwined in the same discussion. For twenty years, United

130

See The Control Group Test, supra note 60, at 424, 425, n.7, 426.

131

Id. at 427-29.

132

See id.

133

Id. at 428.
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Shoe and its progeny134 had typically found those messages to be
privileged so long it was possible find an arguably predominant legal
purpose in the communication. 135 In contrast, the Harvard comment urged
courts to more carefully scrutinize those communications to ensure that
legal advice was the primary reason underlying the discussion. 136 This
was precisely the premise that courts used during the 1970s to set the
groundwork for the clear showing rule.
[40] For example, in United States v. IBM, the court ordered the
defendant electronics manufacturer to produce various categories of
communications involving in-house counsel. 137 In its effort to stave off
the production of these records, the manufacturer argued that the privilege
applied to “all” communications involving its counsel. 138 In rejecting that
sweeping position, the court both clarified and limited the United Shoe
reasoning that related “non-legal considerations” would not affect
counsel’s claim of privilege. 139 To be privileged, the communication
could not merely include “incidental legal advice” from house counsel that
could possibly be called privileged in a subsequent legal proceeding. 140
Instead, the purpose of the communication from the beginning had to be
primarily focused on legal advice. 141 The court opined that a lesser
134

See supra Part II.C.3.a.

135

Functional Overlap, supra note 59, at 1234-35.

136

The Control Group Test, supra note 60, at 427, 430.

137

United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 213-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

138

Id. at 212.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 212-13.
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standard would encourage overreaching and allow for blanket claims over
non-privileged content. 142
[41] The IBM case is significant since it narrows the United Shoe dicta
regarding mixed purpose communications. Just as important, it invited
courts to undertake a more searching inquiry into the privilege claims of
in-house counsel.
[42] That invitation was accepted by the court in SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp., which overruled the defendant’s privilege objections to certain
deposition questions regarding a particular licensing strategy. 143 The
defendant’s president had declined to answer the questions since they
might reveal legal advice that was “interwoven” with related business
decisions. 144 Though legal and non-legal considerations might seem
inseparable, the court nonetheless ordered the disclosure of the business
advice. 145 This was because the privilege could not be permitted to shield
business matters from discovery. 146 Specifically relying on David
Simon’s article, the court declared that the privilege was not intended to
preclude the discovery of relevant, non-legal considerations. 147
[43] The IBM and SCM decisions, together with the Harvard comment,
underscore the greater level of scrutiny that courts were beginning to
apply to house privilege claims. Some courts were simply unwilling to
follow the United Shoe reasoning and blindly accept a privilege assertion
without further inquiry. That increasing scrutiny would disproportionately
142

See Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. at 213.

143

SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 517 (D. Conn. 1976).

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Id. (citing Simon, supra note 22, at 955-56).
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impact corporate counsel in the next decade and beyond with the issuance
of Sealed Case and its clear showing rule.
4. Sealed Case and the Clear Showing Rule
[44] The journey from presumptively privileged under United Shoe to
today’s trend of heightened scrutiny reached a turning point in 1984 with
the issuance of Sealed Case. 148 In that decision, then-Judge Ginsburg
established the clear showing rule to ensure that the privilege claims of
corporate counsel would be properly scrutinized where counsel “had
certain responsibilities outside the lawyer’s sphere.” 149
[45] The rule arose from within the context of a grand jury proceeding
in which a company’s former “vice president-general counsel” was asked
certain questions regarding allegations that the company had engaged in
bid rigging. 150 Counsel had declined to answer several questions on the
ground that they called for the disclosure of privileged discussions. 151 The
district court overruled most of the privilege assertions and ordered
counsel to respond accordingly. 152
[46] On appeal before the D.C. Circuit, the court affirmed some of the
district court’s rulings. 153 In so doing, the court essentially reiterated that
in-house counsel’s claims were on equal footing as those of retained

148

In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

149

Id. at 99.

150

Id. at 96-97.

151

Id. at 97.

152

Id.

153

Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 96.
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counsel. 154 Nevertheless, the court added a critical caveat: “The lawyer
whose testimony the government seeks in this case served as in-house
attorney.” 155 Since counsel also had non-legal duties as a company vicepresident, the court required the company to make a clear showing that
counsel had offered legal advice: “The Company can shelter [counsel’s]
advice only upon a clear showing that [counsel] gave it in a professional
legal capacity.” 156
[47] With the clear showing rule now articulated, the court proceeded to
make several rulings on the questions at issue. 157 In one particular
instance, the district court held that the privilege claim did not yield as
counsel was supposedly “acting as a corporate executive, not as a
lawyer.” 158 The D.C. Circuit rejected that argument, finding instead that
counsel had advised the company president on the enterprise’s legal
matters. 159
[48] Though the disputed claims of privilege in Sealed Case were not
exactly monumental, they did provide a vehicle for introducing the clear
showing rule. Simply put, the rule requires an organization to establish
with greater certainty that the advice from its corporate lawyer was made
in its capacity as a legal counselor, and not as a business advisor. Such a
straightforward explanation would not seem to be such a significant
deviation from the standard established by United Shoe. However, in the
jurisprudence that has followed and invoked the Sealed Case decision, it
154

See id. at 99.

155

Id. at 99 (emphasis added).

156

Id. (citing SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus. Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C. 1981).

157

Id. at 99-103.

158

Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 101.

159

Id.
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has become apparent that courts are using the clear showing rule to
conduct a more extensive inquiry of in-house counsel’s privilege claims.
D. The Proliferation of the Clear Showing Rule and the
Corresponding Increase in Judicial Scrutiny
[49] In the nearly thirty years since Sealed Case, the clear showing rule
has permeated the concept of privilege. This phenomenon—which has
raised the level of scrutiny on house privilege claims—is evident in both
commentary and case law from the succeeding decades. In this Section, I
will discuss some of that commentary. I will also cite a representative
sampling of court decisions, which demonstrate the extent to which the
clear showing rule and its increased level of scrutiny have proliferated
throughout United States privilege jurisprudence.
1. Commentary on the Clear Showing Rule
[50] The commentary and scholarship on the clear showing rule evince
the range and acceptance of this concept as the majority rule regarding inhouse privilege claims. To be sure, there has been criticism of the rule and
its resulting impact on corporate counsel. 160 For example, in her 1998
article published by the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Amy Weiss
criticized the trend of heightened scrutiny caused by the clear showing
rule. 161 In particular, Weiss cited a resolution from the American Bar
Association (ABA) House of Delegates condemning the trend. 162
According to the ABA, such a trend threatened to relegate in-house
counsel to “some form of second-tier status” among American lawyers. 163
160

See, e.g., Spahn, supra note 1, at 295-96, 308-10 (criticizing court-appointed special
master Paul Rice’s approach used in In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 501 F.
Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007)).
161

See Weiss, supra note 87, at 393-94.

162

Id. at 394.
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[51] Despite such disapproval, commentators and organizations
generally agree that the clear showing rule is here to stay. The late Paul
Rice, who was a leading commentator on the privilege, 164 succinctly
captured what is now the prevailing view in his authoritative treatise:
Many courts fear that businesses will immunize internal
communications from discovery by placing legal counsel in
strategic corporate positions and funneling documents through
counsel . . . . As a result, the courts apply the privilege cautiously,
and require a clear showing that the attorney was acting in his
professional legal capacity before cloaking documents in the
privilege’s protection. 165

[52] What is perhaps most instructive from Rice’s discussion on the
rule is the supporting rationale from the judiciary. The judicial concerns
that Rice raised regarding companies using the privilege claims of their
internal counsel to “immunize” materials from discovery are directly in
line with the warnings raised in the Yale Law Journal nearly sixty years
earlier. 166
[53] Such views are also squarely in line with those of David
Greenwald, another privilege commentator. 167 Alluding to Simon’s
warnings, Greenwald acknowledged in his treatise that courts now apply
heightened scrutiny to house privilege claims to ensure that organizations
163

Id.

164

See Preface to RICE, supra note 51 (Professor Rice apparently compiled “the only
exhaustive work on the attorney-client privilege in the United States” through 35 years of
work as a special master for complex litigation, researcher, and professor).

165

Id. at § 7:2 (emphasis added); see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d
789, 797 (E.D. La. 2007).
166

See generally Simon, supra note 22.

167

DAVID M. GREENWALD, 1 TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1:51 (2012).
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do not “hide mountains of otherwise discoverable information behind a
veil of secrecy.” 168
[54] As those commentators confirm, courts are increasingly vigilant in
their efforts to penetrate corporate zones of silence and to prevent the use
of internal counsel as a privilege “sanctuary.” This development is
evident in the cases cited in the following Subsection.
2. Judicial Treatment of the Clear Showing Rule
[55] Courts have generally used the clear showing rule since the
issuance of Sealed Case to more carefully evaluate the privilege assertions
of house counsel. Perhaps best exemplified in the United States v.
ChevronTexaco Corp. decision, 169 many other cases have likewise
demonstrated the continued efficacy of this doctrine.
[56] For instance, in Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., the court followed Sealed
Case and held that various communications involving the defendants’ inhouse counsel were not privileged. 170 The defendants had argued that the
discussions at issue were privileged since they touched on various legal
aspects associated with a corporate restructuring effort. 171 Analyzing the
defendants’ claims through the lens of the clear showing rule, the court
168

Id.; see also Neuberger Berman Real Estate Income Fund, Inc. v. Lola Brown Trust
No. 1B, 230 F.R.D. 398, 411, n.20 (D. Md. 2005) (citing the Greenwald treatise and
acknowledging the trend of heightened scrutiny while applying the general framework
from United Shoe).
169

United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076-77 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (citing In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
170

Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16418, at *30-33
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012), modified, No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46274
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012).
171

Id. at *13-15.
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rejected that assertion. 172 The court felt constrained to apply greater
scrutiny given the multiple roles of in-house counsel and the concern that
the defendants could “conduct their business affairs in private simply by
staffing a transaction with attorneys.” 173 Indeed, it turned out that many of
the communications focused on the business considerations associated
with the restructuring effort. 174 As a result, the court held that scores of
those messages were not privileged, despite the inclusion of internal
counsel. 175
[57] Similarly, the court in United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp.
applied the clear showing rule to certain discussions involving the
defendant’s in-house counsel. 176 Just as in Craig, the ChevronTexaco
court reasoned that the involvement of house counsel required a more
probing inquiry into the company’s privilege assertions. 177 This inquiry
culminated in the production of a few messages that were previously
withheld as privileged. 178
[58] Likewise in Argenyi v. Creighton University, the court used the
clear showing rule to order an in camera inspection of thirty-three
documents involving the defendant university’s in-house counsel. 179 The
172

See id. at *18, 33-46.

173

Id. at *28 (quoting ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1076).

174

Id. at *12, 27-31.

175

See Craig, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16418, at *33-46.

176

See ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.

177

See id. at 1076.

178

See id. at 1078.

179

Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., No. 8:09CV341, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89194, at *13
(D. Neb. Aug. 10, 2011).
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documents had been withheld on privilege grounds and a privilege log had
been produced to substantiate the university’s objections. 180 However, in
light of counsel’s business responsibilities as a company vice president,
the court gave little credence to the log. 181 Applying heightened scrutiny,
the court found that some of the discussions at issue were non-privileged
and ordered their production. 182
[59] The Craig, ChevronTexaco, and Argenyi cases all relied on the
specific clear showing language from Sealed Case as the rationale for
applying greater scrutiny. These decisions and several others highlight the
rule’s ubiquitous application in contemporary jurisprudence. 183 Indeed, the
clear showing requirement is often used without being explicitly
mentioned. 184

180

See id. *12-14.

181

See id. *14 (citations omitted).

182

See id. at *14-16.

183

See, e.g., Solis v. Milk Specialties Co., 854 F. Supp. 2d 629, 633-34 (E.D. Wis. 2012)
(holding that certain reports developed by in-house counsel were not privileged since
they dealt with business matters); Lindley v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 267 F.R.D.
382, 389 (N.D. Okla. 2010) (applying “heightened” scrutiny to find that many in-house
privilege claims were not justified); Se. Penn. Transp. Auth. v. CaremarkPCS Health,
L.P., 254 F.R.D. 253, 262 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (finding particular messages were privileged
since they were made to secure legal advice, not business advice).
184

See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Rexnord Corp., 196 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D. Mass. 2000)
(observing that the privilege claims of corporate counsel are “questionable in many
instances” since counsel “may wear several other hats (e.g., business advisor, financial
consultant)”).
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[60] These cases also emphasize the disparate level of scrutiny that now
applies to house privilege claims as opposed to those of outside counsel.185
The rule from United Shoe regarding the equal status of lawyers’ privilege
claims is now rarely cited. Instead, courts take great pains to explain why
in-house counsel’s claims must be treated differently—and with greater
scrutiny.
[61] Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Sealed Case progeny is
the implicit concern about corporate zones of silence. In light of judicial
understanding that in-house lawyers frequently render business advice to
their organizational clients and given the sweeping privilege claims of so
many enterprises, courts invariably feel compelled to apply heightened
scrutiny to those claims. 186 To do otherwise would be tantamount to
abdicating the judiciary’s obligation to ensure that privilege assertions are
both narrowly construed and clearly established by the claimant.
[62] The confluence of issues underlying such concerns has been
magnified by the role of technology in business operations and in
litigation. E-mail has been particularly troublesome in this regard due to
the sheer volume of messages that include in-house lawyers and which fall
within the permissible scope of discovery. 187 As discussed in Part III,
however, various other aspects of e-mail are combining to invite unwanted
transparency and further judicial scrutiny into the privilege assertions of
in-house counsel. 188

185

But see, e.g., Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666, 676 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d,
Avianca, Inc. v. Harrison, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying the clear showing rule
to outside counsel’s privilege claims due to his role as business advisor to the client).

186

See Danna, supra note 27, at 1696-97.

187

See Spahn, supra note 1, at 294.

188

See infra Part III.
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III. THE PROMISCUOUS USE OF E-MAIL HAS INVITED ADDITIONAL
SCRUTINY INTO THE PRIVILEGE CLAIMS OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
[63] The scrutiny that courts use to evaluate internal counsel’s privilege
assertions has become far more acute as digital age technologies have
grabbed the discovery spotlight. 189 While the clear showing rule has
increased the level of judicial inquiry into in-house privilege claims, that
trend has been augmented by widespread e-mail use. Indeed, there is near
universal agreement on this issue as both courts and cognoscenti agree that
e-mail is inviting further probing into such claims.
[64] In this Part, I explore the correlation between e-mail and the trend
of increasing scrutiny. This includes a discussion of the three key aspects
of e-mail usage and management that have compelled the courts to more
carefully examine internal lawyers’ privilege assertions. These aspects—
the ease of involving counsel on non-privileged e-mails, tactically
sanitized privilege logs, and overlooked draft e-mails—all serve to
undermine such assertions. I will also examine the Oracle trilogy of
opinions and how that case illustrates the quintessential problems that email has created for these claims.
A. The Correlation Between E-mail and Heightened Scrutiny
1. The Ease of Including Counsel on Non-privileged
E-mails
[65] E-mail has wrought a remarkable change for organizations. 190 It
provides a seamless opportunity for companies to draw in-house counsel
into various aspects of their operations. 191 To be sure, corporate officers
189

See Danna, supra note 27, at 1695-97.

190

Spahn, supra note 1, at 292-93.

191

See United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-112, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, at *9 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 16, 2004) (reasoning that the “rise of e-mail as the primary mode of corporate
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have often consulted with their legal team on issues outside of traditional
legal matters. But the rise of e-mail has expanded this phenomenon
beyond what was imaginable in previous decades. Indeed, counsel is
likely to be included on any conversation that could conceivably have
legal or business significance for the corporation. 192
[66] While this development may be a value-add for many companies,
it also presents substantial complications for their in-house privilege
claims. 193 The ease of including counsel on any communication through a
simple “reply,” “cc,” or “forward,” regardless of its content, has raised the
“zone of silence” specter for the judiciary. 194 One commentator framed
the issue in this fashion:
While it has always been possible for litigants to assert scurrilous
privilege claims as to non-privileged paper documents addressed
to counsel, such abusive tactics may have become more pervasive
with the emergence of electronic technology. The copying and
forwarding functions unique to e-mail communications provide an
effortless means of concealing “smoking guns” by veiling them
behind a “smoke screen” of privilege. 195

communication permits the broad dissemination and near-complete documentation of
corporate communications”).
192

Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9861, at *32 (N.D.
Ill. June 3, 2002) (explaining that e-mail has replaced many forms of traditional business
communications such as “informal messages that were previously relayed by telephone
or at the water cooler”).
193

See In re Vioxx Prods. Liabi. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798 (E.D. La. 2007).

194

See In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178, 186 (D.N.J. 2003).

195

Danna, supra note 27, at 1700 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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[67] This is particularly significant given the massive amounts of e-mail
now existing in most corporate electronic information systems. 196 Many
organizations do not wish to incur the expense associated with conducting
a document-by-document privilege review that may span terabytes of emails. 197 While Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and so-called “clawback”
arrangements may help obviate the costs of additional review personnel or
the acquisition of more sophisticated electronic review tools, 198 they do
nothing to reverse the increasing scrutiny that courts now use to flesh out
meritorious claims from those that are frivolous.
[68] As the virtual proximity of counsel and the sheer volume of ESI
have encouraged unsubstantiated privilege assertions, courts seem more
inclined than ever to view in-house counsel’s privilege objections with
increased skepticism. 199 For example, in United States v. Segal, the court
was called on to determine whether the privilege protected ninety-one
electronic messages from discovery, many of which involved one of the
defendant’s general counsel. 200 Before adjudicating the claims, the court
observed that two particular factors had added significant complexity to

196

See Spahn, supra note 1, at 293 (noting that “[w]hile in the past conversations between
legal and non-legal personnel may have simply been lost to the ether, now there are
permanent records of nearly every ‘conversation’ conducted through . . . e-mails”).
197

See Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005) (explaining the
costs and conundrums associated with a document-by-document privilege review).
198

FED. R. EVID. 502(d); see also FED. R. EVID. 502 (advisory committee notes)
(discussing the rule’s framework for addressing the problems associated with the
inadvertent production of ESI).

199

Danna, supra note 27, at 1700 (explaining that “the temptation to withhold nonprivileged e-mail messages directed to or sent by corporate counsel has grown with the
overall increase in communications running to or from corporate counsel due to e-mail.”).
200

See United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-112, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, *1-*2, *6*7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2004).
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the privilege analysis. 201 The first was the “expanded role of corporate
general counsel” in rendering business advice to the company. 202 The
second was the “rise of e-mail as the primary mode of corporate
communication . . . .” 203 Given these factors, the court applied heightened
scrutiny to evaluate the defendant’s privilege objections. 204 Several of
those objections were overruled because the messages included general
counsel for business considerations. 205
[69] Likewise, in In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, the
defendant pharmaceutical company’s use of e-mail with its internal legal
department invited additional court probing regarding its claims of
privilege. 206 Observing that e-mail had allowed in-house lawyers to be
conveniently included “on every communication that might be seen as
having some legal significance at some time,” the court also remarked that
e-mail enabled house counsel to become involved at a much earlier stage
in business transactions. 207 These factors, along with requests for
counsel’s advice on “business, technical, scientific, promotional and
public relations” matters, required the court to more carefully scrutinize
privilege claims involving the company’s in-house counsel. 208
201

Id. at *9.

202

Id.

203

Id.

204

See id.

205

United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-112, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, *2, 9-14 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 16, 2004).
206

In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 797-98 (E.D. La. 2007).

207

Id. at 798.

208

Id. at 798.
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[70] Under this framework, many of the company’s privilege objections
were overruled. 209 In particular, the court rejected claims over e-mails
that were widely distributed to lay employees and that happened to include
internal lawyers on the recipient list. 210 By using such a scattershot
approach for its distribution strategy, the company essentially conceded
that the dominant purpose of the e-mails was not focused on obtaining
legal advice. 211 Nor did the content of those messages become privileged
once a lawyer replied to a particular e-mail. 212 Unless those materials
were produced, the court would provide its imprimatur to the
impermissible corporate strategy of using counsel to immunize nonprivileged material from discovery. 213
[71] The Vioxx decision highlights the pervasive problem with
corporate privilege claims in the era of e-mail messaging, i.e., the
inclusion of in-house counsel on non-privileged communications. 214
Whether inadvertently or intentionally, the over-inclusion of counsel in emails through a “cc,” “reply,” or “forward” invites further judicial
examination of such privilege claims.
[72] Another instance of this phenomenon is found in In re Gabapentin
Patent Litigation, where the District Court for the District of New Jersey
ordered the production of several e-mails previously withheld as
privileged given the perfunctory inclusion of counsel on “routine

209

See id. at 804-05

210

See id. at 805-06.

211

See Vioxx, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 805-06.

212

See id. at 806.

213

See id. at 797 (quoting RICE, supra note 51, at § 7:2, at 34-35).

214

See id. at 798 (citing RICE, supra note 51, § 7:3, at 59-61).
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business” communications. 215
Taking issue with the plaintiffs’
indiscriminate use of the privilege, the court characterized the following
situational e-mails as non-privileged: “Including an attorney on the
distribution list of an interoffice memo, Cc’ing numerous people who are
ancillary to the discussion, one of whom happens to be an attorney, or
forwarding an e-mail several times until it reaches an attorney.” 216
[73] Similarly, in Fru-Con Construction Corp. v. Sacramento
Municipal Utility District, the court condemned the defendant utility
district’s efforts to prevent the discovery of non-privileged e-mails
involving its in-house counsel. 217 Holding that such communications were
subject to discovery, the court criticized the district for asserting that the emails were protected even though counsel was copied for ancillary
reasons. 218 While such e-mails might be “embarrassing” to the district,
that reason could not possibly justify a claim of privilege. 219
[74] These cases and many others exemplify how e-mail has enabled
organizations to turn the virtual proximity of in-house counsel into an
impermissible privilege “sanctuary” for non-privileged ESI. Such conduct
has given rise to another troubling aspect of e-mail that has invited
additional court scrutiny—strategically sanitized privilege logs. 220
215

In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178, 186-87 (D.N.J. 2003).

216

Id. at 186.

217

See Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., Civ. No. S-05-0583 LKK
GGH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59066, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2006).
218

See id.

219

See id. at *15.

220

See, e.g., United States, ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv1002-Orl-31TBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012);
B.F.G. of Ill., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99 C 4604, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18930, at
*15 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001);
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2. Strategically Sanitized Privilege Logs
[75] The bitter fruit of internal counsel’s inclusion on non-privileged emails is the heightened judicial inquiry into the adequacy of parties’
privilege logs. 221 Designed to satisfy the procedural requirement that a
privilege objection be stated with particularity, privilege logs have in
practice been converted into a costly game in which litigants disclose as
little as possible about the communications they have withheld as
privileged. 222 Such a strategy is understandable given a claimant’s
reluctance to reveal privileged content. 223 Nevertheless, this tactic often
backfires since courts now frequently review privileged materials to
substantiate the claims. 224 Moreover, because organizations tend to make
blanket privilege assertions over masses of e-mails involving house
counsel, courts generally expect to find non-privileged content. 225 The

221

See, e.g., Baklid-Kunz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944, at *14-15 (holding that several
e-mails identified in the privilege log involving internal counsel were not privileged).
222

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(5)(A)(ii). Rule 26(b)(5)(A) requires parties to “describe the
nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—
and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected,
will enable other parties to assess the claim.” Id. The failure to serve a timely and
adequate privilege log could result in a waiver of the privilege’s protection. See
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408
F.3d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that a tardy and inadequate privilege log
resulted in a privilege waiver); Kevin Brady, Top 10 Things You Never Hear on Privilege
Logs, ESPECTABLE.COM (Jan. 10, 2013), http://espectable.com/942/.

223

See Brady, supra note 222.

224

See Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege “Cautiously and Narrowly” Applied to InHouse Counsel, PRESNELL ON PRIVILEGES (Jan. 10, 2013),
http://presnellonprivileges.com/2013/01/10/corporate-attorney-client-privilegecautiously-and-narrowly-applied-to-in-house-counsel/.
225

See Ameritech, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18930, at *15.
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case of B.F.G. of Illinois, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp. is particularly instructive
on this issue. 226
[76] In Ameritech, the court ordered the defendants to produce hundreds
of e-mails previously withheld as privileged, many of which involved inhouse counsel. 227 In their privilege log, the defendants buried the nonprivileged content from those e-mails behind whitewashed descriptions. 228
Suspicious that in-house counsel was apparently deployed on business and
not purely legal matters, the court elected to use heightened scrutiny to
ensure that the claims involving counsel were proper. 229 The court’s more
probing examination revealed that the defendants used in-house counsel
“to give a veneer of privilege to otherwise non-privileged business
communications.” 230 This was particularly frustrating to the court, which
observed that the privilege log, as drafted, obstructed any effort to verify
the claims short of an in camera inspection. 231
[77] As the Ameritech case teaches, the twin abuses of overreaching
privilege claims and deceptive privilege logs can only be detected through
heightened scrutiny. 232 Such discovery misconduct has also triggered the
onerous requirement that individual e-mails be separately identified in a
226

See generally id.

227

See id. at *13.

228

Id. at *16-17.

229

See id. at *15 (reasoning that where in-house counsel is deployed on business instead
of legal matters, the organization claiming the privilege must satisfy “a particular burden
. . . to demonstrate why communications [involving counsel] deserve protection and are
not merely business documents.”).
230

Ameritech, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18930, at * 15 (citation omitted).

231

See id. at *19.

232

See id. at *16, *19.
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privilege log. 233 The United States, ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax
Hospital Medical Center case reflects this troubling trend. 234
[78] In Baklid-Kunz, the court overruled several privilege objections in
connection with e-mails that included the defendants’ internal lawyers. 235
The e-mails in question did not involve legal advice, but instead simply
“copied” counsel or kept them “in the loop” on various business issues.236
To ensure that all such e-mails were properly scrutinized and thereby
prevent further “funneling of non-privileged information” through
counsel, the court held that the defendants’ privilege log was required to
identify each message in an e-mail string. 237 Even though digital age
technology had allowed all messages in the string to be grouped together,
233

See, e.g., NLRB v. Interbake Foods, LLC, 637 F.3d 492, 503 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating
that e-mails generally should be separately identified in a privilege log); Hillsdale Envtl.
Loss Prev. Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, Civil Action 10-2008-CM-DJW,
10-2068-CM-DJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *18 (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 2011)
(holding that requirement that each e-mail be separately identified was necessary to
address a defendant’s “stealth” privilege claims regarding non-privileged e-mails
involving its in-house counsel).
234

United States, ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv-1002-Orl31TBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012). While the majority
rule requires litigants to separately list each message from an e-mail string in a privilege
log, there are cases that have only required parties to identify only the “last-in-time” email. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 510, 517,
n.9 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining that the court would only consider “the most recently
sent e-mail” in a string claimed as privileged); Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials
Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 238, 240-41 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that e-mails between lay
employees that are later directed to in-house counsel and which seek legal advice need
not be listed in a privilege log since the log’s description might disclose the nature of the
privileged consultation).
235

Baklid-Kunz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158944, at *33.

236

Id.

237

Id. at *9, *14.
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the court ordered the messages to be individually listed to provide the
challenging party with an opportunity to better evaluate the merits of the
claim. 238
[79] In similar fashion, the court in In re Universal Service Fund
Telephone Billing Practices Litigation required that individual e-mails be
separately identified in a privilege log. 239
The defendant
telecommunications provider had argued that it should be permitted to
group messages from an e-mail string under a single entry. 240 In rejecting
that argument, the court cited concerns over “stealth” privilege assertions
that “could never be the subject of a meaningful challenge by opposing
counsel or actual scrutiny by a judge.” 241 Despite the additional costs and
burdens that such a rule would undoubtedly impose on the defendant, it
was deemed necessary to counteract abuses with privilege claims. 242
Applying that rule to the provider’s objections, the court eventually held
that numerous e-mails involving house counsel were not privileged. 243
[80] The Ameritech, Baklid-Kunz, and Universal Service Fund cases
and other decisions 244 amply demonstrate how organizations’ privilege log
238

Id. at *14-16.

239

In re Unv’l Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 232 F.R.D. 669, 672, 674 (D. Kan.
2005).
240

Id. at 672.

241

Id. at 673.

242

Id. at 674.

243

See id. at 674, 677-80; accord NLRB v. Interbake Foods, LLC, 637 F.3d 492, 503 (4th
Cir. 2011).
244

See generally Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16418 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012), modified, No. 4:08-CV-2317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46274 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012); Acosta v. Target Corp., 281 F.R.D. 314 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(criticizing the defendant’s tactics surrounding its privilege log and imposing costs and
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practices with respect to e-mail have increased the scrutiny that courts
now apply to in-house privilege claims. 245 Such privilege log tactics and
the claims they are designed to protect are also being exposed by
undetected draft e-mails.
3. Overlooked Draft E-mails
[81] A third and final complicating factor involving e-mail is the
existence of electronically generated drafts. 246 Draft e-mails are a
particularly tricky proposition since there is generally no historical
analogue for this form of ESI. 247 While paper drafts of contracts or other
documents may have been retained in some instances, corporate records
related penalties as a punishment for doing so); Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Fresenius
Med. Care Holding, Inc., No. C 07-1359 PJH (JL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85180 (N.D.
Ca. Oct. 10, 2008) (following majority rule and ordering the defendants to separately
identify each message contained in an e-mail string); St. Andrews Park, Inc. v. United
States Dept. of the Army Corps of Eng’rs, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(holding that the defendant’s grouping of e-mails in its privilege log ran afoul of the rule
that each e-mail should be separately identified).
245

The consequences of such scrutiny are not limited to privilege arena. The collateral
impact includes a dramatic rise in attorney fees relating to privilege log litigation. See
Unv’l Serv. Fund, 232 F.R.D. at 674 (lamenting the expense associated with the
preparation of a privilege log which requires litigants to separately identify each message
from an e-mail string). There are efforts being made to reverse this trend, though it is
unclear whether they will ultimately be successful given the factors identified in this
Subsection. See John M. Facciola & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Asserting and Challenging
Privilege Claims in Modern Litigation: The Facciola-Redgrave Framework, 4 FED. CTS.
L. REV. 19, 49 (2009) (arguing that in certain instances parties should be required to log
only the so-called “last-in-time” message in an e-mail string).
246

See Oracle II, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *5-6 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 20, 2011) (explaining that Gmail accounts by default auto-save drafts every few
minutes).
247

See generally Charles A. Lovell & Roger W. Holmes, The Dangers of E-mail: The
Need for Electronic Data Retention Policies, 44- R.I. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 7, 8 (discussing
the relative ease of recovering deleted and prior drafts of e-mails through discovery).
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management policies generally did not require the retention of paper drafts
of internally circulated memoranda. 248 Even in those few instances where
a paper draft may have been kept, it is doubtful that every draft of the
memo was retained by the organization or its internal legal team. 249 As
one commentator observed, “it is unlikely that a party would print out and
retain every preliminary draft of a document.” 250
[82] That last point illustrates a striking difference between paper
documents and ESI. 251 Unlike paper, many e-mail systems have
functionality that provides for the creation and retention of drafts while the
e-mail is being prepared. 252 If an organization has designed its electronic
information systems to retain those draft e-mails, they may become a
particularly important source of information in discovery. 253 Martin
Redish, an expert in federal civil procedure, highlighted the significance of
draft ESI for discovery purposes in the Duke Law Journal in 2001. 254 As
Redish explained, draft ESI can provide clarity on certain issues since it
248

See id.

249

See Corrinne L. Giacobbe, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding
Who Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 257, 260-61 (2000).
250

Id. at 261.

251

See id. at 260 (explaining that “litigants who fail to request electronic data will never
find many files through traditional means of paper discovery”).
252

See, e.g., Byers v. Ill. St. Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9861, at *32
(N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002) (observing that “computers have the ability to capture several
copies (or drafts) of the same e-mail, thus multiplying the volume of documents. All of
these e-mails must be scanned for both relevance and privilege.”).
253

See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J.
561, 587-88 (2001).

254

See generally id.
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may reveal insights into corporate decision-making before being sanitized
“for political correctness and legal considerations.” 255 As the Oracle
litigation makes clear, those same observations regarding ESI are equally
applicable to e-mail. 256
[83] Given their potential importance in litigation, e-mail drafts can
become a conundrum for companies, particularly with respect to their inhouse privilege claims. 257 If a company cannot match up those drafts with
the “sent” version involving house counsel that it has claimed as
privileged, the drafts may be produced in discovery. 258 This could expose
the withheld e-mail to additional scrutiny, particularly if the drafts impugn
the credibility of the privilege claim. 259 Such a scenario is beyond a
hypothetical, as demonstrated in the Oracle privilege dispute.
B. Oracle America v. Google—The Quintessential Example of
How E-mail Has Increased Judicial Scrutiny
[84] While the above referenced cases illustrate how e-mail has
introduced additional, unwanted transparency into the privilege claims of
corporate counsel, none of these decisions captures the issues quite like
the Oracle litigation. The Oracle case spotlights how the three troubling
aspects of e-mail analyzed in this Part all served to invite heightened
255

Id.; accord Giacobbe, supra note 249, at 261 (explaining the potential significance of
draft ESI in litigation).
256

Oracle III, 462 F. App’x. 975, 976-78 (Fed. Circ. 2012); Oracle II, No. C 10-03561
WHA, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011); Oracle I, No.
C 10-03561 WHA DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *6-11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26,
2011).
257

See Oracle III, 462 F. App’x at 976-78.

258

See, e.g., Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *5-10, 12.

259

See, e.g., id. at *2, *9.
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scrutiny into Google’s claim of privilege over a critical e-mail sent to one
of its internal lawyers.
1. The Lawsuit
[85] The litigation involving technology titans Oracle America
(“Oracle”) 260 and Google involved claims of copyright and patent
infringement with respect to features of Java and Android. 261 In
particular, Oracle alleged that Google had misappropriated its Java
technology to bolster its widely popular Android operating system. 262 As
part of the effort to establish its claims, Oracle presented in court a draft
that Google produced in discovery of the privileged e-mail. 263 Shortly
thereafter, Google notified Oracle that the draft was also privileged and
demanded its return, along with all of the other drafts of the e-mail that
were mistakenly produced. 264 Oracle disputed the privilege claim, arguing
instead that the e-mail was not privileged and went to the heart of its
infringement allegations. 265

260

Oracle America, which is owned by Oracle Corporation, is a successor-in-interest to
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Company Overview of Oracle America, Inc., BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=34903
(last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
261

Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *7.

262

See id.

263

See d. at *8.

264

See id.

265

See Oracle I, No. C 10-03561 WHA DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 26, 2011).
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2. The Disputed E-mail
[86] The e-mail at issue originated from Tim Lindholm, a Google
software engineer. 266 It was prepared shortly before Oracle filed its
infringement lawsuit and while the parties were engaging in negotiations
to stave off litigation. 267 Lindholm sent the message to a Andy Rubin, a
Google Vice President in charge of Android, as well as Ben Lee, a Google
Senior Counsel, and included another Google engineer, Dan Grove, in the
“cc” field. 268 In the message’s salutation, Lindholm specifically directed
the e-mail only to Rubin. 269 Lindholm explained that he and Grove had
been asked by Google founders Larry Page and Sergei Brin to “investigate
what technical alternatives exist to Java for Android and Chrome.” 270 The
investigation had proven unsuccessful, with Lindholm ultimately
concluding that the alternatives to Java “all suck.” 271 Lindholm suggested
that Google should “negotiate a license for Java under the terms we
need.” 272
[87] Before the e-mail was sent to its recipients, Google’s internal email system saved nine drafts of the message. 273 Those drafts were
266

The e-mail is reproduced verbatim in Oracle II and in Oracle III. Oracle III, 462 F.
App’x. 975, 976 (Fed. Circ. 2012); Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *7-8.
267

See Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *5-8.

268

See Oracle III, 462 F. App’x. at 976.

269

See id.

270

Id.

271

Id.

272

Id.

273

See Oracle II, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 20, 2011).
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sequentially created, showing the gradual development of the message. 274
It was not until the final draft that Lindholm included the headings
“Attorney Work Product” and “Google Confidential.” 275 Moreover, the
names of the e-mail recipients were not found in any of the saved drafts. 276
[88] In discovery, Google withheld the disputed e-mail, along with the
ninth and final draft, on privilege grounds. 277 Google represented in its
privilege log that the e-mail and corresponding draft reflected a privileged
communication with its in-house counsel, Lee. 278 Google nonetheless
produced the other eight drafts of the e-mail since its “electronic scanning
mechanisms” did not flag the drafts before they were disclosed. 279 This
apparently happened because the draft messages “did not contain . . .
confidentiality or privilege headings . . . [or] any addressees.” 280
3. The Magistrate’s Production Order
[89] Motion practice surrounding the disputed e-mail took place first
before U.S. Magistrate Judge, Donna Ryu. 281 In contesting Oracle’s
production request, Google argued that Lindholm was conducting the
research referenced in the disputed e-mail at the direction of Google’s
274

See id. at *6.

275

See id.

276

See id.

277

Id. at 9.

278

See Oracle II, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *8.

279

280

Id.
Id.

281

Oracle I, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 26, 2011).
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general counsel as well as Lee. 282 According to Google, since the research
was designed to help Google’s counsel render legal advice on the pending
lawsuit, the e-mail was privileged. 283 That position, argued Google, was
further confirmed by Lindholm’s insertion of the “Attorney Work
Product” and “Google Confidential” designations. 284
[90] Judge Ryu rejected these assertions, ruling instead that Google had
failed to meet the test of heightened scrutiny. 285 Judge Ryu explained that
Google had to make a clear showing that the presence of Lee on the e-mail
was for the purpose of providing legal advice to the company. 286 The
judge reasoned that such a showing was critical since “[i]n-house counsel
may act as integral players in a company’s business decisions or activities
. . . .” 287
[91] Using the clear showing rule as a touchstone, Judge Ryu reasoned
that the plain language of the e-mail contradicted Google’s after-the-fact
explanations. 288 While Lee was included in the “To” portion of the email, the salutation was directed to Rubin, a lay company executive. 289
The e-mail also conflicted with Google’s assertion that Lindholm had
282

See id. at *6-8.

283

See id.

284

See id. *7.

285

See id. at *17-18.

286

Oracle I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *18 (citing United States v.
ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
287

Id. at *17.

288

See id. at *14-16.

289

Id. at *7.
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performed the referenced research at the direction of legal counsel. 290
Instead, Lindholm unequivocally explained in the message that his
research was performed at the direction of Google’s lay founders, Brin and
Page. 291 Moreover, Lindholm’s reference that his research was related to
Chrome—a Google product not implicated by Oracle’s lawsuit—belied
Google’s representation that the research was focused on the pending
litigation. 292 Finally, merely labeling a document as “Work Product”
could not satisfy the standard of heightened scrutiny required for such a
communication. 293 Since Google had failed to meet the clear showing
requirement, the court stripped the disputed e-mail of its privilege
designation and ordered its immediate production to Oracle. 294
4. The District Court’s Order Denying Google’s
Objections to the Magistrate’s Order
[92] Dissatisfied with Judge Ryu’s ruling, Google filed various
objections to the production order and brought the matter before U.S.
District Judge William Alsup. At the heart of Google’s objections was its
contention that the magistrate had used the wrong legal standard by
applying Sealed Case’s heightened scrutiny test to the disputed e-mail. 295
Judge Alsup declined to adopt that position, observing that such scrutiny
was necessary to counteract the common corporate practice of including
in-house counsel on “business communications as an attempt to cloak a
290

See id. at *14-16.

291

Oracle I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96121, at *7, 13.

292

Id. at *14.

293

Id. *14-16.

294

See id. at *20.

295

Oracle II, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *23 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 20, 2011) (citing In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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business message in privilege.” 296 Finding that the magistrate’s use of
heightened scrutiny was proper, the court overruled Google’s other related
objections to the magistrate’s order. 297
5. The Federal Circuit’s Denial of Google’s Mandamus
Petition
[93] Google’s final effort to prevent disclosure of the disputed e-mail
came before the Federal Circuit. In its mandamus petition, Google again
challenged the application of the clear showing rule, but this time with a
twist on its prior argument. Unlike the objection it filed with the district
court, Google conceded the propriety of the rule. 298 Nevertheless, Google
argued that the rule was limited to those instances where internal counsel
was also tasked with business responsibilities. 299 Since there was no
evidence that Lee had any duties outside of his legal work, Google argued
that there was no basis for using the rule. 300 Indeed, Google characterized
the magistrate’s holding as a “radically broadened version” of the clear
showing doctrine. 301
[94] The Federal Circuit found this position to lack merit. Sidestepping
the distinction Google raised regarding house counsel’s duties, the court
opined that Google was still required to show that the e-mail’s primary
purpose was to obtain legal advice. 302 Irrespective of Lee’s duties as
296

Id. at *23-24 n.4.

297

See id. at *23, 30.

298

Oracle III, 462 F. App’x. 975, 977-78 (Fed. Circ. 2012).

299

See id. at 978.

300

See id.

301

Id.

302

See id.
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counsel, communications such as the Lindholm e-mail that were focused
on business strategy and not legal advice could not be protected as
privileged. 303 The court accordingly denied Google’s mandamus petition.
6. The Legacy of Oracle on E-mail Privilege Claims
Involving House Counsel
[95] The Oracle case amply demonstrates the troubles that e-mail has
caused for the privilege assertions of in-house lawyers. Indeed, the three
aspects of e-mail that are inviting further court scrutiny into such claims
were central issues in that case. With the virtual proximity that e-mail has
introduced into internal corporate communications, it was easy for Lee to
be included on a business related e-mail. Given Lee’s inclusion on the email and the sensitive tenor of Lindholm’s conclusions, it was strategically
sensible for Google to withhold the document as privileged. While
Google’s privilege log predictably gave no indication that the e-mail was
focused on business matters, the drafts it mistakenly produced belied its
privilege objection. These factors invited the court to probe more deeply
into the content of the communication to ensure that it met the clear
showing rule. Were any of these elements lacking from the equation, a
different result may very well have occurred.
[96] The legacy of Oracle for in-house privilege claims is indeed
problematic. While the Federal Circuit may have circumvented Google’s
argument on the clear showing rule, it does not change the fact that
Google was correct in noting that the Sealed Case doctrine has been
expanded beyond its original intent. While the clear showing rule was
originally designed to ensure that claims asserted by counsel with legal
and business roles were more carefully reviewed, most courts now assume
that corporate lawyers are rendering business advice. 304 Nevertheless, that
assumption seems justified given the realities of today’s corporate
303

See Oracle III, 462 F. App’x at 978.

304

See, e.g., id.
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workplace and the increasing transparency that e-mail provides into
counsel’s communications. The confluence of these factors suggests that
companies will find it more difficult in the future to make defensible
claims of privilege.
[97] The clear lesson from Oracle is that companies must implement
better practices with respect to their employees’ promiscuous use of e-mail
as well as their privilege reviews in discovery. Until they do,
organizations can expect to find more probing by judicial officers who
treat their privilege assertions with understandable cynicism. Moreover,
such skeptical scrutiny figures to expand beyond the realm of e-mail as inhouse lawyers and their corporate colleagues use newer, more promising,
and yet more disruptive technologies to conduct internal communications
and business strategy.

IV. THE IMPACT OF PROMISING YET DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND
TRENDS ON IN-HOUSE PRIVILEGE CLAIMS
[98] The concerns surrounding the impact of technology on the
privilege claims of in-house lawyers are not limited to just e-mail. As
other digital age advances revolutionize the ways in which companies
conduct their business operations, they also have the potential to
negatively impact these claims. Such advances include social networking
sites, cloud computing, and BYOD policies. While these innovations can
facilitate effective and efficient commercial enterprise, they could also
jeopardize the sacrosanct element of confidentiality required for privileged
communications.
[99] In this Part, I discuss how these innovations are providing
unwanted transparency into the otherwise privileged communications of
in-house lawyers. This includes an analysis of how such advances enable
third party access to those communications, which might compromise the
perception of confidentiality between counsel and the organizational
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client. I also address how courts would likely evaluate the merits of such
claims given the absence of controlling legal authority on these issues and
in light of heightened scrutiny.
A. Communications Made through Social Networking Sites
May Not Be Privileged
[100] Social networking sites represent a burgeoning communications
frontier. 305 While extremely popular among individual consumers,306
social media is also widely accepted and increasingly used in most
industry verticals. 307 The legal profession is no exception to this growing
trend. 308 An increasing number of lawyers are using social networks for
305

See Allison Walton, Social Media and eDiscovery: New Kid on the Block, but the
Same Story, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/ediscovery-blog/2011/09/30/social-media-and-ediscovery-new-kid-on-the-block-but-thesame-story/ (describing social media as the “new e-mail” and discussing related
discovery challenges).
306

See Social Networking Popular Across Globe, PEW RESEARCH (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/12/12/social-networking-popular-across-globe/ (“In
countries such as Britain, the United States, Russia, the Czech Republic and Spain, about
half of all adults now use Facebook and similar websites.”).
307

See Peter J. Pizzi, Where Cyber and Employment Law Intersect, Risks for
Management Abound, ASPATORE, July 2011, at *1, available at 2011 WL 3020563 (“By
2014, some say that social media will replace upwards of 20 percent of the use of
workplace e-mail.”); see NIELSEN, STATE OF THE MEDIA: THE SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT
2012 1, 2 ( 2012), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reportsdownloads/2012-Reports/The-Social-Media-Report-2012.pdf (The prevalence of
personal use of social networking sites has arguably fueled its popularity in the business
world.).
308

See Matt Silverman, How Lawyers Are Using Social Media for Real Results,
MASHABLE (June 1, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/06/01/lawyers-social-media/
(“[I]n-house attorneys now are using new media platforms to deepen their professional
networks; to obtain their legal, business, and industry news and information; and to
enrich their social and personal lives. Most importantly, they expect that trend to
accelerate in the future.").
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various professional reasons. 309 While research and marketing are far and
away the most common uses, lawyers are also communicating with clients
regarding legal issues. 310
This includes in-house attorneys, who
correspond with lay employees over social networks about internal
corporate matters. 311
[101] While social networks may offer in-house lawyers a convenient
and comfortable medium to discuss internal company issues, they could
present insurmountable challenges for preserving the privileged character
of those discussions. This is due in substantial part to the terms of service
that govern the use of those sites. In this Subsection, I highlight common
terms of service that provide social networks with access to user content.
These access rights often include content from so-called private messages
sent through a network’s direct messaging functionality. I also examine
how courts would interpret user agreements under existing case authority
and through the lens of heightened scrutiny to construe corporate lawyers’
privilege assertions.

309

Stephanie Francis Ward, Lawyers Using Social Media More, Says ABA Tech Survey,
A.B.A. J. (Aug. 16, 2010, 1:57 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_using_social_media_more_says_aba_te
ch_survey/ (noting that eleven percent of lawyers surveyed use social media for
“professional reasons, which is up from [six percent] in 2011.”).
310

See Wendy L. Patrick, “Proceed With Caution” Navigating The Latest Ethical Rules,
TSTJ08 ALI-ABA 27, 45 (2012) (“[M]any lawyers are actively using these [social
networking] sites to share information about their professional lives and showcase their
accomplishments.”); Meghan Ennes, Social Media: What Most Companies Don’t Know,
HAR. BUS. REV., http://hbr.org/web/slideshows/social-media-what-most-companies-dontknow/1-slide (last visited Nov. 24, 2013) (showing that in 69% of organizations, the
marketing department is responsible for development of social media strategy).
311

See Social Media, supra note 38, at 12 (“[Seventy] percent of in[-]house lawyers
between the ages of [thirty] and [thirty-nine] had used Facebook for personal reasons in
the previous [twenty-four] hours and that [fifty] percent had used it for professional
reasons in the previous week.”).
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1. Social Networks’ Messaging Features May Lack the
Confidentiality to Remain Privileged
a. Common Site Features
[102] Social networks provide their users with any number of offerings
to communicate and share content with others. The two most common
features among site offerings are the open forum setting and direct
messaging functionality.
[103] The open forum setting typically allows both the user and those
within the user’s selected community to exchange messages, pictures,
documents, hyperlinks, and other information. Analogous to the traditional
cork-and-pin bulletin board concept, an electronic open forum is designed
to enable widespread circulation of user content. This is certainly the case
with leading social networking sites Twitter, 312 Facebook, 313 MySpace,314
LinkedIn, 315 and reddit. 316 All of these sites provide users with an open
ecosystem that permits broad distribution of user materials.
[104] For example, Twitter allows users to post a pithy message (or
tweet) of no more than 140 characters to their respective communities. 317
312

See About, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/about (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).

313

See About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info (last visited Nov. 1,
2013).
314

See Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE,
https://www.myspace.com/pages/terms (last updated June 10, 2013).
315

See About LinkedIn, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited Nov. 1,
2013).

316

See About reddit, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/about (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).

317

See About, supra note 312.
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The tweet may contain text as well as “photos, videos, and links to other
websites.” 318 However, as expressly set forth in the “Twitter Privacy
Policy,” tweets are generally “public by default” and “may be viewed all
around the world instantly.” 319 Similarly, LinkedIn, Facebook, and
MySpace users can respectively share “updates,” 320 write on a user’s
“wall,” 321 and create a “profile comment,” 322 all of which can then be
viewed instantaneously by members of the user’s group. 323 Reddit 324 and
other social networking sites 325 have similar functionality.
318

Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/privacy (last visited Nov. 1,
2013).
319

Id.

320

Sharing Ideas, Questions, Articles and Website Links, LINKEDIN,
http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/434 (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (“You
can share thoughts, articles or other content-rich websites with others from several places.
This is sometimes known as posting an update or sharing an update.”)

321

Wall Definition, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/266010756746812/?q=wall&sid=06199PxbSjxjs2yZp
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (“Your Wall is the space on your timeline where you and
friends can post and share.”).

322

How to Post a MySpace Profile Comment, FOR DUMMIES,
http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/how-to-post-a-myspace-profile-comment.html
(last visited July 30, 2013) (“Posting a Profile Comment on MySpace is an easy and
effective way to communicate with the members of your Friend List.”).
323

In many instances, other users beyond a member’s direct group may view and remark
content. See Kashmir Hill, The Facebook Privacy Setting that Tripped Up Randi
Zuckerberg, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/12/26/the-facebook-privacy-setting-thattripped-up-randi-zuckerberg/ (describing how Randi Zuckerberg, sister of Facebook
founder Mark Zuckerberg, inadvertently shared a private photo beyond her direct group).
See also Privacy Policy, LINKEDIN § 2(6), http:// http://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacypolicy (last visited July 31, 2013) (“Content distributed through LinkedIn’s sharing
features . . . may result in displaying some of your personal information outside of
LinkedIn.”).
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[105] In contrast, the direct messaging features that some sites furnish to
their users are designed for one-on-one interaction. Instead of publicly
displaying exchanged content to the entire community, direct messages are
received by specified addressees in a virtual inbox. Referred to as “chats”
by reddit, 326 “direct messages” by Twitter, 327 “private messages” by
MySpace, 328 and “messages” by LinkedIn 329 and Facebook, 330 such
discussions may be opened only by the identified recipients. Because
other members of the user’s community are not privy to direct messages,

324

What Is reddit?, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/faq (last visited Nov. 3, 2013)
(“reddit is a source for what’s new and popular on the web. Users like you provide all of
the content and decide, through voting, what’s good and what’s junk.”).
325

See, e.g., Share and Discover, All Across Google, GOOGLE+,
https://www.google.com/intl/en/+/learnmore/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); What Is
Pinterest?, PINTEREST, http://about.pinterest.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); About
Flickr, FLICKR, https://secure.flickr.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
326

See User Agreement, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/useragreement (last updated
April 10, 2012).

327

See Posting or Deleting Direct Messages, TWITTER,
https://support.twitter.com/articles/14606-posting-or-deleting-direct-messages (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013).
328

See Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 314.

329

See Sending Messages to Connections and Contacts, LINKEDIN,
http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1645 (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
330

See The New Messages, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/messages/ (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013).
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those communications have been compared to e-mail 331 and characterized
as “inherently private.” 332
b. Terms of Service Enable Site Employee
Access to User Communications
[106] Regardless of their range of distribution, messages exchanged on
social networks may be accessed and monitored by site employees under
the governing terms of service. While those terms typically provide
privacy settings that allow users to limit the extent to which information
may be disseminated, they also notify users about site employee access to
their communications. The justification for such access varies from site to
site, with the terms of service delineating the lack of confidentiality
associated with user communications, including direct messages.
[107] For example, reddit admonishes users that it monitors all forms of
user “activity” to ensure compliance with its policies. 333 This includes
open forum conduct and supposedly private “chats” between users, as
reddit states that “we may monitor activity on the Website, including in
the bulletin boards, forums, personal ads, and chats . . . .” 334 Twitter and
MySpace are not much different, with each site reserving the right to
“access, read, preserve, and disclose any information” that a user discloses

331

See Ryan A. Ward, Discovering Facebook: Social Network Subpoenas and the Stored
Communications Act, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 563, 572 (2011).

332

Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that messages sent through the direct messaging features provided by Facebook
and MySpace are “inherently private”).
333

User Agreement, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/useragreement (last updated
Apr. 10, 2012).
334

Id.
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on the site. 335 In addition, MySpace expressly advises subscribers that its
access rights extend to all communications, including “private Myspace
messages.” 336
[108] Facebook takes a different tact, notifying its members that it
collects their data for marketing and operational purposes. 337 That data
specifically includes information gleaned from user messages. 338 And if
the trend toward site employee access of user communications was not
apparent enough, LinkedIn warns its users not to post any “confidential”
information to its site: “[I]f you have an idea or information that you
would like to keep confidential . . . do not post it to any LinkedIn Group,
into your Network Updates, or elsewhere on LinkedIn.” 339
2. Site Access to In-house Counsel’s Communications
May Destroy Confidentiality
[109] Third party access to social media messages may very well doom a
privilege claim over internal corporate messages involving in-house
counsel. This is because courts have generally taken a strict approach on
the level of confidentiality required for a communication to be considered
privileged. 340 Anything short of absolute confidentiality between client
335

Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Nov. 3, 2013);
see also Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 314.

336

See Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 314.

337

See Facebook Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
338

See id.

339

User Agreement, LINKEDIN § 2(10), http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (emphasis added).

340

Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prev. Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, CIV. A. 102008-CM-DJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 2011) (citing
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and counsel—such as a voluntary disclosure to a third party 341—could
either keep the privilege from attaching or cause it to be waived. 342 A
lone caveat to this rule is that courts must assess the issue of
confidentiality from the standpoint of the client. 343 Such a provision
enables the privilege to attach only if the client reasonably understood that
her discussion with counsel was to be confidential. 344
[110] With these standards in mind, it is difficult to conceive how
communications between in-house counsel and corporate employees over
social networks could be privileged except in the narrowest of
circumstances. Messages, posts, or other material communicated through
an open forum setting would be voluntarily disclosed to the user
communities of both counsel and the employees.
Such broad
dissemination of user content to any number of third parties would
undoubtedly vitiate an assertion of confidentiality regarding the message.

New Jersey v. Sprint, 258 F.R.D. 421, 426 (D. Kan. 2009) (noting that the privilege is
generally lost if the client voluntarily reveals the contents of an otherwise privileged
discussion to a third party).
341

This limitation does not include third party agents of lawyers. See RICE, supra note
51, at §3:3 at 13-21 (2010) (“To the extent that the communications would have been
protected had they been with the attorney, courts have extended the privilege to the
substantive advice and assistance of associates, investigators, interviewers, technical
experts, accountants, physicians, patent agents, and other specialists in a variety of social
and physical sciences.”).
342

See, e.g., Hillsdale, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *8 (quoting Sprint, 258 F.R.D. at
426).
343

See RICE, supra note 51, at §6:6 at 6-40-6-41 (citations omitted).

344

See Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., Ltd., 918 F. Supp. 491, 510 (D.N.H.
1996) (observing that the “key question in determining the existence of a privileged
communication is ‘whether the client reasonably understood the conference to be
confidential.” (quoting Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir. 1984)).
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[111] In like manner, site employee access to so-called private messages
involving in-house lawyers may also destroy the confidentiality required
to keep the communication privileged. 345 Such a result would be
consistent with the general legal principles on this issue, including that of
the client’s “reasonable understanding.” This is because corporate
employees 346 and counsel would likely be deemed to have understood,
agreed to, and accepted the site terms of service, including site
representative access to their direct messages. 347
[112] This is nonetheless an open issue as the courts have yet to weigh in
on this specific privilege conundrum. Furthermore, case authority on
related issues appears to be divided. On the one hand, various federal and
state courts have made clear that social networks are not an “online
lockbox of secrets.” 348 For example, in McMillen v. Hummingbird
Speedway, Inc., a Pennsylvania state court explained that parties could not
expect to keep information “confidential” on social networks given the
applicable terms of service. 349 Referring to both Facebook and MySpace,

345

Mallory Allen & Aaron Orheim, Get Outta My Face(Book): The Discoverability of
Social Networking Data and the Passwords Needed to Access Them, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH.
& ARTS 137, 146 (2012) (“Litigants attempting to invoke their right to privacy based on a
reasonable expectation that information stored on either Facebook or MySpace is private
may face difficulty overcoming the fact that according to the plain language of most
social networking sites’ policies, little to no privacy is guaranteed.”).
346

Barring some exceptional circumstance, the employees’ knowledge and understanding
would be imputed to the organization under basic agency principles. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006).
347

See, e.g., Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 314.

348

Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, at *8 (Pa. Com. Pl., Nov. 8,
2011) (“Only the uninitiated or foolish could believe that Facebook is an online lockbox
of secrets.”).
349

McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-3010CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 270, at *5-6 (“Yet reading [Facebook and MySpace’s] terms and privacy
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the court observed that users of those networks unequivocally agreed to
allow site representatives to monitor and disclose their communications.350
That, the court declared, “is wholly incommensurate with a claim of
confidentiality.” 351
[113] On the other hand, direct messages have been found to be “private”
given their similarity to e-mail. 352 In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, a Los
Angeles federal court refused to permit disclosure under the Stored
Communications Act of certain communications that the plaintiff had sent
through the direct messaging features of Facebook and MySpace. 353 The
court reasoned that those messages were “inherently private” since, just as
with e-mail, they were “not readily accessible to the general public.”354
Subsequent commentators have likewise joined the Crispin court on this
issue, opining that direct messaging features are “sufficiently similar to email communications to apply the same jurisprudence.” 355
policies should dispel any notion that information one chooses to share, even if only with
one friend, will not be disclosed to anybody else.”).
350

Id. at *5-9

351

Id. at *9.

352

See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981-82 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
353

See id. at 991.

354

Id. at 991.

355

Evan E. North, Note, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social
Network Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1300 (2010) (arguing that the body of
privacy law regarding e-mail correspondence should likewise apply to direct messages
sent through social networking sites). While there is perhaps a logical analogy between
e-mail and direct social media communications for purposes of privacy law, that analogy
is not equally applicable to the issue of confidentiality under the attorney-client privilege.
As the Crispin court illustrates, individuals can enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their communications even though third parties may be privy to their messages.
Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991; see supra notes 340-44 and accompanying text.
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[114] Despite their respective merits, each line of authority is
fundamentally limited as neither considers the issue of confidentiality
through the lens of privilege law. Nor do they take into account the role of
heightened judicial scrutiny or the factual nuances that typically
encompass a privilege claim involving in-house counsel. Given these
limitations, and in the absence of controlling authority, other case law
must be explored for guidance. The jurisprudence that arguably provides
the most logical analogue on this issue involves decisions that have
addressed the merits of employee workplace privilege claims.
3. Evaluating In-house Counsel’s Privilege Claims
Under Employee Workplace Privilege Jurisprudence
[115] Employee workplace privilege claims generally involve a scenario
in which a company is seeking to discover e-mails that a former—and now
adverse—employee sent to its counsel while employed with the company.
As the former employee’s e-mails have either been sent over the company
network and/or with a company-issued device, the employer argues that
they are subject to company policies that eliminate any reasonable
expectation of privacy in the workplace. Without an expectation of
privacy, the employer contends that confidentiality is absent from the
worker’s e-mails with counsel. The lack of confidentiality, in turn,
destroys an otherwise defensible claim of privilege.
[116] To stave off production, the employee typically maintains that its
expectation of confidentiality in the e-mails was reasonable. The worker
will often point to a lack of employee knowledge and/or employer
enforcement of workplace privacy policies. In essence, the employee
asserts that a type of estoppel arises given the lack of or arbitrary
adherence to those policies.
[117] In response to such arguments, the judiciary has fashioned a fact
intensive analysis to determine whether or not the employee’s expectation
of privacy was reasonable under the circumstances. That analysis
generally turns on whether the employer could access worker e-mails,
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whether the employer monitored worker e-mail usage, and whether the
employer provided notice of its policy on these issues to its workers.
These three factors—access, monitoring, and notice—may be seen as
similarly essential for determining whether social media communications
involving in-house counsel are sufficiently confidential to be privileged.
They are considered in detail in In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 356 the
leading case on employee workplace privilege claims. 357
[118] In Global Crossing, the court was asked to resolve a privilege
dispute similar to the scenario described in this Subsection. 358 To
determine whether the employee had an “objectively reasonable”
expectation of confidentiality in the e-mails exchanged with his lawyer,
the court evaluated the tripartite factors of access, monitoring, and
notice. 359 With respect to access, there was no reasonable dispute that the
employer could review employee e-mails. 360 Despite such access, the
company neither enacted nor enforced a workplace privacy policy. 361 Nor
were certain employees specifically notified that their e-mails would be
356

See generally In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).

357

See, e.g., Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1108-09 (W.D.
Wash. 2011) (“[M]ost state and federal courts evaluating whether an employee has
waived the attorney-client privileged status of personal communications transmitted,
stored, or saved onto a company computer or laptop, have applied the four-factor test
initially set forth in In re Asia Global.”) (citations omitted); In re Reserve Fund Sec. &
Derivative Litig., 275 F.R.D. 154, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“In In re Asia Global
Crossing, Ltd., the court set forth a four-factor test — which has been widely adopted. . .
.”) (citations omitted).
358

In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. at 251.

359

See id. at 259.

360

Id. (Asia Global clearly had access to its own servers and any other part o the system
where e-mail messages were stored . . . .”)
361

See id.
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monitored. 362 Taking into account both the lack of enforcement and
notice regarding the policy, the court rejected the company’s arguments
regarding confidentiality and sustained the employee’s privilege claim. 363
[119] The Global Crossing factors have been repeatedly applied to
resolve comparable employee workplace privilege claims. In several of
those decisions, courts have found that the employee maintained a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality. For example, in Curto v.
Medical World Communications, Inc., the plaintiff’s claims of privilege
were upheld since her employer generally neglected to monitor worker email usage consistent with its stated policy of doing so. 364 A similar result
was found in Convertino v. United States Department of Justice where the
government agency’s privacy policy did not proscribe personal employee
e-mail and did not notify the plaintiff that the agency would monitor his email. 365
[120] Various other decisions following Global Crossing have reached a
contrary result on the issue of confidentiality and have rejected employee
privilege claims. In In re Royce Homes, LP, employee assertions of
confidentiality were dashed by a company’s electronic communications
policy. 366 That policy “explicitly banned confidential communications
over its computer system, and cautioned employees that the [company]
could access, view, read, or retrieve employees’ personal communications

362

See id.

363

See In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. at 261.

364

Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29387, at *20-24 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
365

See Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 674 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 2009).

366

See In re Royce Homes, LP, 449 B.R. 709, 744 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) appeal
dismissed, 466 B.R. 81 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
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at any time.” 367 Similarly, the court in In re Reserve Fund Securities and
Derivative Litigation found that the employer’s consistent monitoring of
employee e-mail doomed any assertion of confidentiality by the
employee. 368 And in Hanson v. First National Bank, the worker’s
knowledge of the employer’s e-mail access and monitoring policies
defeated his asserted expectation of confidentiality. 369
[121] The three factors emphasized by Global Crossing and its progeny
should be the determinative factors that the court employs to assess the
confidentiality of direct messages involving in-house counsel. Just as in
Royce Homes, Reserve Fund, and Hanson, a corporate client’s reasonable
expectation of confidentiality could be destroyed if a social network
notifies internal counsel or other employees of its intention to monitor and
access their communications. This is particularly the case if the party
opposing the privilege claim establishes that the site regularly enforced
that policy. Faithful adherence to the monitoring policy would make the
concerns raised in the Global Crossing and Curto decisions inapposite.
[122] Nevertheless, a lack of notice to site users or spotty enforcement of
site policies might still allow a claim of privilege to stand. Despite site
terms such as those from Reddit and MySpace that expressly provide for
monitoring and even interception of direct message content, a site’s failure
to abide by those terms could land the privilege question within the scope
of the Global Crossing and Curto holdings. Moreover, a site’s failure to
articulate an intelligible policy or to properly notify users of that policy
could bring the claim in line with Convertino. Under either of these
scenarios, counsel’s privilege claim could be sustained.
367

Id.

368

In re Reserve Fund Secs. & Derivative Litig., 275 F.R.D. 154, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(applying the Global Crossing factors to a marital communications privilege claim)
(citation omitted).
369

Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125935, at *8, *9
(S.D.W.Va. Oct. 31, 2011).
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4. Heightened Scrutiny as the Deciding Factor
[123] While it is difficult to reach a conclusive determination without
guidance from decisional authority, heightened judicial scrutiny may very
well tip the scales against in-house counsel’s privilege assertions. Given
the complications that e-mail has introduced into the privilege analysis and
judicial wariness regarding corporate zones of silence, courts are likely to
view with skepticism claims involving social media communications.370
This position is substantiated by the disdain courts have expressed
regarding so-called privacy settings that litigants have unsuccessfully
relied on to stave off the production of non-privileged data from social
networks. 371
[124] These combined factors suggest that courts could default to a strict
approach with respect to confidentiality. 372 Under such an approach,
courts would strictly construe the Global Crossing factors to find that
sites’ monitoring policies negate any reasonable expectation of
confidentiality. And without confidentiality, the claim of privilege would
be destroyed. All of which underscores the importance of both in-house
counsel and its client taking appropriate precautions to prevent such a
development.
[125] Such safeguards, however, should not be limited to social media
communications. The same concerns regarding confidentiality likewise
370

See discussion supra Parts II-III.

371

See, e.g., Patterson v. Turner Constr. Co., 931 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (App. Div. 2011)
(“The postings on plaintiff's online Facebook account, if relevant, are not shielded from
discovery merely because plaintiff used the service's privacy settings to restrict access.”)
(citation omitted).
372

See Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prev. Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Nos. 10-2008-CMDJW, 10–2068–CM–DJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *10 (D. Kan. Mar. 23,
2011).
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permeate the analysis over the use of cloud computing to store internal
lawyers’ privileged communications.
B. Communications Stored in the Cloud May Lose Their
Privileged Character
[126] Between e-mail and social networks, companies are inundated on a
daily basis with terabytes of electronic communications. In many
instances, those messages and other ESI have overwhelmed company
servers, storage archives, and backup media. 373 To address the logistical
challenge of maintaining vast volumes of electronic data, organizations
have turned to cloud computing as a storage alternative. 374 With the
promise of low information retention costs 375 and quick data retrieval, the

373

See Philip Favro, Look Before You Leap! Avoid Pitfalls When Moving e-Discovery to
the Cloud, LAW J. NEWSLS., Apr. 2012, available at
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_legaltech/30_1/news/156573-1.html.
374

See, e.g., Ned Smith, Why More Businesses Are Using Cloud Computing, CNBC (July
25, 2012, 1:00 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48319526/Why_More_Businesses_Are_Using_Cloud_Computi
ng (“More than eight in 10 companies currently use some form of cloud solution, and
more than half plan to increase cloud investments by 10 percent or more this year . . . .
[M]ore than half of micro (one to nine employees) and small (10 to 99 employees)
businesses use cloud-based business productivity applications.”); Nicole Black,
Introduction, to GLOBAL CLOUD SURVEY REPORT 2012, LEGAL IT PROFESSIONALS 4, 7
(2012), available at http://www.legalitprofessionals.com/wpcs/cloudsurvey2012.pdf
(“[N]early all respondents acknowledged that cloud computing would ultimately overtake
on-premise computing in the legal industry . . . .”).
375

For the enterprise, the allure of cloud computing is cost savings. See Smith, supra
note 374. The cost to store company ESI in the cloud may be significantly lower than the
cost to add more hardware to accommodate growing digital stores. In addition, cloud
computing offers the opportunity to slash overhead expenses by decreasing employee
headcount and reducing server repair and maintenance.
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cloud computing concept has been widely embraced and is one of the most
popular technologies adopted by organizations. 376
[127] Despite the potential for efficient commercial enterprise, cloud
computing offers a troublesome privilege trap for company
communications with internal lawyers. 377 Just as social networking site
employees are privy to direct messages involving counsel, providers of
cloud computing services often have access and monitoring rights to a
company’s cloud hosted data. Memorialized in service level agreements
(SLA), those rights may very well destroy the confidentiality required to
keep in-house counsel’s discussions privileged. 378
[128] In this Subsection, I review the basic underpinnings of the cloud
computing services model and some common SLA terms that enable
provider employees to access company data. I also discuss how the
judiciary would address the viability of in-house counsel’s privilege
claims through the kaleidoscope of the Global Crossing factors and
heightened scrutiny.

376

Cf. SYMANTEC, AVOIDING THE HIDDEN COSTS OF THE CLOUD 4, 8, (2013), available
at https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/b-state-of-cloud-globalresults-2013.en-us.pdf (finding that “[o]rganizations of all sizes are moving ahead with
cloud implementations” and that 34% of organizations surveyed have had eDiscovery
requests for cloud data but 66% missed the discovery deadline and 41% were unable to
meet the discovery request).
377

See Cindy Pham, E-Discovery in the Cloud Era: What’s a Litigant to Do?, 5
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 139, 139-142 (describing cloud computing, summarizing
“exponential” growth in the cloud market, and discussing related discovery problems).
378

See discussion infra Part VI.B.2.
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1. SLA Terms that Enable Provider Access to Cloud
Hosted Data
[129] While the name “cloud computing” implies a celestial venue for
data storage, the term generally refers to organizations that host company
data in a brick and mortar facility. 379 Like the traditional warehouse
setting, the typical cloud service provider agrees to host company
materials for a fee. 380 To reach the provider’s physical repository, the
company transmits the data electronically through cyberspace. 381 Once
stored in the provider’s cloud archive, company ESI can be accessed and
retrieved on demand by corporate employees. 382
[130] Nevertheless, company employees may not be the only individuals
with access rights to that data. 383 Depending on the nature of the SLA,
379

See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &TECH., THE
NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 1-3 (2011), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf. “Public clouds” fit
most closely into the paradigm discussed in this Subsection. However, certain providers
of “private clouds” and “hybrid clouds” also fall within the scope of this discussion since
they offer third party hosted services. Nevertheless, the cloud industry typically
characterizes a private cloud provider as furnishing a third party service that is hosted on
the contracting company’s site and behind the firewall of that company. In contrast, a
hybrid cloud “is a composition of two or more distinct cloud infrastructures (private,
community, or public)” bound together for interoperability. Id.
380

For example, Dropbox fees range from $795/year for small (fewer than five) member
teams to $31,420/year for large (250) member teams. Pricing, DROPBOX,
https://www.dropbox.com/business/pricing (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
381

See Jonathan Strickland, How Cloud Computing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://www.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing/cloud-computing.htm (last visited Nov.
3, 2013).
382

Id.

383

See Roberta Cooper Ramo, Ethics for American Lawyers in the Age of Twitter and the
Cloud, 72 MONT. L. REV. 227, 233 (2011) (“It is less expensive to use so-called cloud
servers to save massive amounts of material and at the same time have it accessible from
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representatives from the cloud provider may also be able to review,
inspect, and even block data transmissions. For example, the popular
enterprise cloud provider Dropbox unequivocally informs its customers
that certain of its employees will have access to customer data “for the
reasons stated in our privacy policy . . . .” 384 While those reasons include
common caveats such as compliance with third party legal demands,385
they also include the broad exception of “protect[ing] Dropbox’s property
rights.” 386 Dropbox also grants “third party companies and individuals”
access to customer data ostensibly to help improve the level of service that
Dropbox provides. 387
[131] Box, another common corporate provider, has similar access rights
to customer data. 388 In addition to reserving its right to access and turn
over customer data in response to outside legal requests, Box may also
intercept and review data: “We retain the right to block or otherwise
prevent delivery of any type of file, e-mail or other communication to or

virtually any place on the planet. The question is, of course, if it is accessible to you, to
whom else might the material be available on an unauthorized basis? . . . . Are you
putting your clients’ confidential information at risk?”).
384

Security Overview, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited Nov. 3,
2013).

385

Dropbox Privacy Policy, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/privacy (last updated
Apr. 10, 2013). Such “demands” are highly ambiguous and remain undefined throughout
the SLA.
386

Id.

387

Id.

388

Quentin Hardy, Box and Dropbox Come of Age in Cloud Computing, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/box-and-dropboxcoming-of-age-in-cloud-computing/; Box Terms of Service, BOX,
http://box.com/static/html/terms.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2013).
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from the Service as part of our efforts to protect the Service, protect our
customers, or stop you from breaching these Terms.” 389
[132] The iCloud service Apple offers to consumers and small
businesses is likewise invasive of customer-stored data. 390 Under a
section of the iCloud SLA entitled “Access To Your Account and
Content,” Apple specifies that it may open and review stored data to
ensure the customer’s “compliance with any part of this Agreement.”391
This includes broadly defined scenarios such as addressing “security,
fraud or technical issues,” or protecting “the rights, property or safety of
Apple, its users, a third party, or the public as required or permitted by
law.” 392 Additionally, Apple may seize customer data that it finds to be
objectionable “without prior notice and in its sole discretion . . . .” 393
2.
Cloud Provider Access to In-house Counsel’s
Communications May Eliminate Confidentiality
[133] While Box, DropBox, and iCloud represent just a small sampling
of a growing industry, their SLA terms exemplify the type of third party
389

Box Terms of Service, supra note 388.

390

iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/legal/icloud/en/terms.html (last updated Sept. 18, 2013).
391

Id.

392

Id.

393

See id.; see also Robert X. Cringely, Hollywood Whodunit: What’s Eating E-mails in
iCloud?, INFOWORLD (Nov. 19, 2012),
https://www.infoworld.com/t/cringely/hollywood-whodunit-whats-eating-e-mails-inicloud-207335?page=0,1; Jared Newman, Barely Legal Teens: Apple iCloud E-mails with
Naughty Phrases Deleted, T IME (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://techland.time.com/2013/03/01/classic-apple-icloud-e-mails-deleted-for-naughtyphrases/ (reporting that iCloud blocked the transmission of a movie script sent via e-mail
due to allegedly objectionable language).
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access that could destroy the confidentiality required to keep stored copies
of in-house counsel’s internal communications privileged. 394 However,
given the absence of governing case authority and the similarity of this
issue to that of social networking site access to user messages, courts will
likely turn to Global Crossing to determine the issue of confidentiality. 395
[134] The impact of the Global Crossing factors—access, monitoring,
and notice—would undoubtedly turn on the cloud provider’s SLA. 396 If a
provider’s SLA has terms similar to those promulgated by Box, DropBox,
and iCloud, the issues of access and notice would weigh against
confidentiality. Some courts, like in Royce Homes, may quickly conclude
that a provider’s notice of unambiguous access to cloud hosted data may
vitiate any claim of confidentiality over counsel’s stored
communications. 397 For other judges, a determination of the issue might
instead come down to the company’s knowledge that its provider could
394

Cf. Yenny Teng-Lee, Comment, Fourth Amendment Protection for Users’ Information
Stored in the Cloud: The Case of Mint.com, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 65, 70-72, 79-84
(2012) (analyzing the third party doctrine and the impact of cloud SLAs on users’
reasonable expectation of privacy in the fourth amendment context).
395

See JAY E. GRENIG ET AL., 1 EDISCOVERY & DIGITAL EVIDENCE § 2:11 (2012) (“Case
law has not yet caught up with cloud computing, but legal commentators have begun to
explore the possible ramifications of this new ESI phenomenon.”); supra Part IV.A.3.
396

See supra Part IV.A.3.

397

See In re Royce Homes, LP, 449 B.R. 709, 744 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) appeal
dismissed, 466 B.R. 81, 94 (S.D.Tex. 2012).; see also REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY 53 (2009), available at
http://old.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu60/PrivacyInitiativeTaskForceHome/NYSB
APrivacyRptFinalHOD4309.pdf (“In general, these TOU and Privacy Policies do not
afford the necessary level of restriction and protection for privileged client information
and attorney work product, or information protected by a right of privacy, so that an
attorney professionally and ethically cannot agree to subject such information to those
TOU and Privacy Policy. In that case it will be impermissible for an attorney to use
cloud computing, cloud storage or virtual computing in his or her practice.”).
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access those privileged communications. 398 Similar to Hanson, such
knowledge could potentially defeat the enterprise’s expectation of
confidentiality. 399
[135] The more reasoned analysis, however, would take into account the
critical factor of monitoring, i.e., enforcement of the SLA. Parties
opposing in-house counsel’s claim of privilege would more likely prevail
in motion practice if they could show that providers like iCloud regularly
flag and block stored communications or other cloud-hosted data. 400 Like
the holding in Reserve Fund, evidence of consistent monitoring by the
cloud provider would likely defeat an assertion of confidentiality by the
corporate claimant. 401 In contrast, arbitrary monitoring or an overall lack
of enforcement would probably leave a privilege claim undisturbed. 402 As
398

See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S.746, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“And
employer policies concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable
expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly
communicated.”).
399

See Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125935, at
*23 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011) (finding that a party, knowing that his employer “could
access and monitor his e-mail communications with his criminal attorney, had no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy or confidentiality in them and effectively
waived the attorney-client privilege” in using his employer’s computer system to
communicate with his attorney.).

400

See supra note 384 and accompanying text.

401

See Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig. v. Reserve Mgmt. Co., 275 F.R.D. 154,
164 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457(RRM)(RML),
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *33-34 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) (finding that an
employee had no reasonable expectation or confidentiality in e-mails sent through his
employee account because the employer “had a clear and long-consistent policy of
limiting an employee’s personal use of its systems, reserving its right to monitor an
employee’s usage of the system, and making abundantly clear to its employees . . .that
they had no right to privacy when using them.”).
402

See, e.g., Haynes v. Office of Att’y Gen., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162 (D. Kan. 2003)
(finding, despite a daily warning against an expectation of privacy, that inconsistent
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the Global Crossing and Curto cases teach, consistent enforcement of the
provider’s access rights is the touchstone of the confidentiality analysis. 403
3. Heightened Scrutiny May Tip the Scales on the Issue
of Privilege
[136] How a court ultimately decides this issue of privilege may depend
on how the heightened scrutiny test is applied. While e-mail technology
has generally increased the judiciary’s cynicism toward in-house privilege
claims, that attitude may not necessarily extend to the use of cloud
computing. This is because many state bar organizations, as well as the
American Bar Association, have approved the use of cloud providers to
store client communications and other information. 404 The seal of
approval from reputable bar organizations regarding cloud computing
could distinguish this innovation from the more notorious reputation of
social networking sites.
[137] Nevertheless, the sanction from bar organizations is typically
contingent on the due diligence that lawyers exercise to ensure that
appropriate safeguards are deployed to preserve confidentiality. 405 Such
enforcement and other factual considerations suggested “the plaintiff’s expectation of
privacy was objectively reasonable”).
403

See supra Part IVA.3.

404

See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398
(1995) (noting the requirement of reasonable effort to ensure no unauthorized disclosure);
Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/res
ources/charts_fyis/cloud-ethics-chart.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
405

Bob Ambrogi, Florida Legal Ethics Opinion Clears Way for Cloud Computing,
CATALYST (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.catalystsecure.com/blog/2013/02/florida-legalethics-opinion-clears-way-for-cloud-computing/ (noting that many states have adopted
ethics opinions regarding the use of cloud computing and that they almost universally
condone the use of cloud storage “provided [lawyers] exercise due diligence to ensure
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due diligence may entail the inclusion of specific confidentiality terms in
the SLA. 406 It might alternatively require the execution of a separate
confidentiality agreement with the cloud provider. 407 While those
measures may vary from state to state, and depending on different factual
scenarios, bar organizations and commentators generally agree that
counsel must take “professionally recognized, reasonably appropriate
steps to protect the information stored ‘in the cloud . . . .’” 408 Such advice,
which is typically directed toward outside counsel, is equally applicable to

that the cloud provider maintains adequate safeguards to protect the confidentiality and
security of client information”).
406

See, e.g., Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op.
2011-200, 13 (2011), available at http://www.slaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/2011200-Cloud-Computing.pdf (“Generally, the consensus is that, while ‘cloud computing’ is
permissible, lawyers should proceed with caution because they have an ethical duty to
protect sensitive client data. In service to that essential duty, and in order to meet the
standard of reasonable care, other Committees have determined that attorneys must (1)
include terms in any agreement with the provider that require the provider to preserve the
confidentiality and security of the data, and (2) be knowledgeable about how providers
will handle the data entrusted to them. Some Committees have also raised ethical
concerns regarding confidentiality issues with third-party access or general electronic
transmission (e.g., web-based [e-mail]) and these conclusions are consistent with
opinions about emergent ‘cloud computing’ technologies.”).
407

See, e.g., N. C. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 6 (2011), Subscribing to Software as a
Service While Fulfilling the Duties of Confidentiality and Preservation of Client Property
(last modified Jan. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/printopinion.asp?id=855 (follow “Adopted Opinions”
hyperlink under “Ethics” tab; then search by title) (providing a list of recommended
security measures a lawyer should take when working with a cloud provider, including
issuing an agreement on “how the vender will handle confidential client information in
keeping with the lawyer’s professional responsibilities”).
408

See George Jacobs & Kenneth Laurence, Liability Under Ethical Standards, in 51
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES, PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE § 17.6 n. 12 (2013)
(discussing Massachusetts rules of professional responsibility in relation to lawyers using
cloud services).
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in-house attorneys, particularly given their dual role as both counsel and
client on behalf of the organization. 409
[138] Thus, if in-house lawyers and their client organizations take
adequate measures to ensure the confidentiality of their cloud hosted
messages, courts may very well apply a more deferential level of scrutiny
and let their privilege claims stand. 410 Such a development would be
welcomed across the spectrum of industry verticals given the ubiquitous
adoption of cloud computing. It might also provide some much needed
direction regarding the impact of BYOD on the privilege given the
interplay between this innovation and cloud computing.
C. BYOD May Jeopardize the Confidentiality of In-house
Counsel’s Communications
[139] The hottest technology trend affecting businesses today is
undoubtedly BYOD. 411 BYOD is driven by companies that are competing
for top industry talent, which often prizes the use of SFF devices in the
workplace. 412 Faced with demands for high-end gadgets equipped with
the latest and greatest applications, companies must decide whether to
409

See United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp.2d 1065, 1076-77 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (observing that in-house counsel invariably occupy the roles of lawyer and client
on behalf of the organization).
410

To the extent client and counsel took reasonable steps in this regard, subsequent third
party access to communications could arguably be considered an “inadvertent disclosure”
and not a waiver of the privilege. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
411

See Greg Day, Overview from Greg Day On the Topic of Bring Your Own Device—
The Challenges Facing Today and How This Trend Will Evolve in the Future,
SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.com/tv/news/details.jsp?vid=1555866669001 (last
visited Nov. 1, 2013) (describing the BYOD trend and associated challenges).

412

See Matt DeWolf, Next Challenges for BYOD, MICROSOFT (Jan. 4, 2013),
https://www.microsoft.com/enterprise/it-trends/mobility/articles/Next-Challenges-forBYOD.aspx.
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spring for such high cost items or lose a potentially brilliant employee to a
competitor. 413
[140] For many organizations, BYOD policies provide an acceptable
middle ground to this quandary. With a BYOD policy in place, companies
allow their employees to use their own devices for work. 414 While this
enables the enterprise to slake its workers’ thirst for cutting edge
innovations, it also provides a cost savings opportunity to the employer.415
With enhanced worker satisfaction and decreased company costs, BYOD
seems like a win-win for everyone involved.
[141] Everyone, that is, except for the in-house lawyers whose privilege
claims could be compromised. For while BYOD has a tremendous upside
for both sides of the employment equation, it presents a difficult challenge
for preserving the confidentiality of counsel’s communications. This is
due to the lack of corporate control introduced by BYOD over those
messages and other ESI. In this Subsection, I examine the two common
scenarios in which a lack of control may create issues with confidentiality.
I also discuss the effect of heightened scrutiny on BYOD-impacted
privilege assertions.

413

Cf. Tom Kaneshige, Infographic: BYOD’s Meteoric Rise, CIO (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://blogs.cio.com/consumer-it/17707/infographic-byods-meteoric-rise (noting that
“[sixty-three] percent of employees believe BYOD positively influences their view of the
company.”).
414

STEPHEN S. WU, A LEGAL GUIDE TO ENTERPRISE MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT:
MANAGING BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE (BYOD) AND EMPLOYER-ISSUED DEVICE
PROGRAMS 15 (2013).
415

See, e.g., Thor Olavsrud, How BYOD Saved VMWare $2 Million, CIO (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.cio.com/article/728095/How_BYOD_Saved_VMware_2_Million (“[A]
number of high-profile companies—Cisco, VMWare and Ingram Micro among them—
have reported significant savings [with BYOD].”).
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1. BYOD Challenges to Maintaining the Confidentiality
of Privileged Messages
[142] The attraction of BYOD is also the inherent cause of its problems.
By allowing the employee to conduct work duties on a personal device,
the company yields a substantial amount of control over corporate
information to the employee. 416 This lack of employer control could
compromise the confidentiality of privileged discussions in two different
scenarios.
[143] The first involves employee use of personal cloud storage
providers in connection with the BYOD dynamic. Employees often turn
to such providers to facilitate data transfers to company databases and to
act as a storage medium. 417 Nevertheless, such providers, which include
Box, DropBox, and iCloud, often grant their employees broad access
rights to review, intercept, and block customer data. 418 As detailed in the
previous Subsection, such third party access could impugn the
confidentiality of in-house lawyers’ privilege assertions.
[144] While the prospect of cloud employee access is troubling enough,
a more problematic scenario involves the use of the employee’s computer
by her family, friends, or others. 419 The typical company safeguards over
416

See Henry Z. Horbaczewski & Ronald I. Raether, Know the Privacy and Security
Issues Before Inviting Employee-Owned Devices to the Party, ACC DOCKET, Apr. 2012,
at 71, 72 (“Security starts with knowing what data resides where, and who has access to
that data. With employee-owned devices, the main unique issue from a security
perspective is loss of control.”).
417

See Walton, supra note 10 (highlighting data security as a primary BYOD risk,
especially when personal cloud storage is involved).
418

See supra Part IV.B.

419

See Bryan T. Allen, The Legal Side of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), PARR BROWN
GEE & LOVELESS (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.parrbrown.com/newsevents/articles/view/272 (“The most important

84

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 1

a workplace device (login credentials, encryption, etc.) may be nonexistent
or lacking in sophistication to prevent use by others. 420 Worse, login
credentials might be shared or a device could be left on without security
measures. Under these scenarios, it is not difficult to envision how a
roommate, teenage child, or even a stranger could take, text, or tweet
company information. 421 Setting aside the potential for misappropriation
of trade secrets of other proprietary information, 422 such third party access
could destroy the confidentiality of any privileged messages found on the
device.

provisions in a BYOD policy are the provisions designed to protect the company’s
confidential information from getting into the hands of third parties or being used by an
employee for non-company purposes.”).
420

See Reece Hirsch, What Every General Counsel Should Know About Privacy and
Security: 10 Trends for 2013, 12 PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 128 (2013), available at
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/BNA_WhatEveryGCShouldKnow_28jan13.pdf (“If a
company's security policy calls for encryption of all company-owned mobile devices, but
an employee uses his or her own unencrypted smartphone to store company data and that
phone is hacked, then it could be argued that the company has not met the standard for
reasonable security.”); Horbaczewski, supra note 416, at 71, 72.

421

See Lisa Milam-Perez, Littler Mendelson Attorney Warns of Pitfalls of “BYOD”,
WOLTERS KLUWER (July 29, 2012),
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/2012/07/29/littler-mendelson-attorneywarns-of-pitfalls-of-byod/ (describing best practices for BYOD policies: “No use by
friends and family members! ‘I got the most guff for this one . . . and I imagine you
probably will too. I know your kid likes to play Angry Birds, and I know you bought it
with your own money,’ but it’s an essential control . . . .”); Privacy Roundtable
Highlights, RECORDER (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202591017099 (discussing the risk of
misappropriation of company data by family members sharing devices that may also be
used for work under BYOD policies).
422

See PHILIP BERKOWITZ ET AL., THE “BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE” TO WORK
MOVEMENT: ENGINEERING PRAC’TICAL EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW COMPLIANCE
SOLUTIONS 10 (2012) (describing legal challenges to BYOD policies such as
implementing legal holds, protecting trade secrets, and proving misappropriation).

85

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 1

2. Judicial Treatment of Privilege Claims Affected by
BYOD
[145] The judiciary’s treatment of BYOD-impacted privilege assertions
will likely be similar to the analysis used to address claims affected by
cloud computing. 423 To the extent such privilege disputes arise from the
use of cloud providers, the legal analysis under the Global Crossing
factors would be equally applicable. In contrast, the third party device
access scenario would probably be evaluated on the given facts
surrounding the access that others had to the employee device. However,
the deciding factor under either of these situations would likely focus on
how closely client and counsel followed best industry practices to
maintain the confidentiality of those messages. 424
[146] Companies that make little to no effort to incorporate safeguards
into their BYOD infrastructure can expect more extensive judicial probing
into their assertions of confidentiality and privilege. 425 Just as courts have
belittled the efficacy of privacy settings in preventing the discovery of
social media communications, they may also treat BYOD-related claims
with disdain if neither client nor counsel takes reasonable steps to prevent
unauthorized disclosures of privileged material. 426 The reason for this is
grounded in the basic underpinnings of privilege law: “[C]ourts . . . may
‘grant no greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their

423

See supra Part IV.B.

424

To that end, the guidelines that various bar organizations promulgated regarding the
implications for the privilege by the use of cloud computing would undoubtedly figure
into this analysis. See supra notes 404-07.
425

Hirsch, supra note 420.

426

See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 502(b); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2013).
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own precautions warrant.’” 427 Those companies that fail to jealously
guard confidentiality with best practices for BYOD will likely lose the
privileged status for their internal lawyers’ communications. 428
[147] On the other hand, where “professionally recognized” and
“reasonably appropriate steps” are taken to better secure data transfers as
well as employee personal devices, a court would likely be more
deferential in scrutinizing a company’s assertions of confidentiality. As
discussed in Part V, such steps typically include the development of a
cogent and reasonable BYOD policy, appropriate education of company
employees, and deployment of effective, enabling technologies. Those
same recommendations generally apply to the other problems created for
the privilege by e-mail, social networking sites, and cloud computing.
V. SUGGESTED PRACTICES FOR ENHANCING THE DEFENSIBILITY OF INHOUSE COUNSEL’S PRIVILEGE CLAIMS
[148] Given the role of heightened judicial scrutiny and the impact of
disruptive technologies, companies should adopt practices to ensure that
the protections surrounding their in-house counsel’s privilege claims are
not eroded any further. In this Part, I propose some practical suggestions
for accomplishing this objective.
A. Reduce the Indiscriminate Use of E-mail
[149] The first step that companies can take in reducing the
indiscriminate use of e-mail is to develop an actionable e-mail use policy.
Such a policy would encourage workers to cut back on the promiscuous
use of e-mail with in-house lawyers. For example, lay employees could be
trained regarding the proper use of a “cc,” “forward,” and “reply” with
427

Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prev. Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, CIV. A. 102008-CM-DJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30376, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 2011) (citing
New Jersey v. Sprint, 258 F.R.D. 421, 426 (D. Kan. 2009)).
428

See id.
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respect to counsel. While the nature of that training would vary depending
on the needs of a particular organization, it would likely include an overall
stop and think mandate before adding counsel to a message. For as the
Vioxx, Gabapentin, and Ameritech cases make clear, perfunctorily
including counsel on e-mails either for convenience or for tactical reasons
invites heightened judicial scrutiny. 429
[150] A specific suggestion derived from the Vioxx case would be to
encourage workers to communicate by separate e-mail with internal
lawyers when they must be brought “into the loop” on a specific matter. 430
Such a practice would enhance a privilege claim since the e-mail would be
devoid of other lay recipients. It is the inclusion of various lay employees
in an e-mail to counsel that often leads to doubts about whether the
message was focused on legal advice. As the Vioxx case teaches, stripping
out non-essential, lay recipients tends to strengthen a privilege claim.431
In addition, it clarifies and enhances the objection in the claimant’s
privilege log.
B. Limit the Privilege Log Burden
[151] The challenges of preparing an acceptable privilege log—masses
of potentially privileged e-mails that must be painstakingly reviewed
before each claim is reduced to a concise statement —are well known to
clients, counsel, and the courts. Besides reducing the quantity of
potentially privileged e-mails, the best way to circumvent this costly and
tedious process that draws so much judicial scrutiny is for the litigants to
enter into a stipulation that limits the scope of a log. Indeed, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(f) specifically requires the parties to develop a

429

See supra Part III.

430

See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 805-06 (E.D. La. 2007).

431

See id.
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“discovery plan” that addresses “any issues about claims of privilege.”432
At the Rule 26(f) discovery conference, the parties could explore possible
limitations on privilege logs such as: (1) only identifying the last-in-time
e-mail in a particular string; 433 (2) preparing a privilege log by category; 434
or (3) eliminating the log altogether. 435
[152] If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, they should seek
judicial involvement to help fashion an acceptable protocol. 436 Regardless
of the method, parties that narrow the extent of their privilege log
obligations will almost certainly reduce the level of judicial wrangling
over their privilege assertions.
C. Use Technology to Identify Draft E-mails
[153] Organizations will likely need to deploy technology to prevent the
mistaken production of draft e-mails. This could include tools that help
match up draft e-mails with their final, privileged counterparts. 437
Alternatively, there are technologies that can isolate privileged drafts and
thereby increase the chance of removing them from a production set.438
432

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).

433

See Facciola & Redgrave, supra note 245, at 49.

434

See SEC v. Nacchio, No. 05-cv-00480-MSK-CBS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5435, *31
(D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2007) (approving the concept of a privilege log by category).
435

See Brady, supra note 222.

436

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).

437

See, e.g., Our Technology, CONTENT ANALYST COMPANY,
http://www.contentanalyst.com/html/tech/technologies_near_duplication.html (last
visited Dec. 10, 2013).
438

See Liesa L. Richtera, Making Horses Drink: Conceptual Change Theory and Federal
Rule of Evidence 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669, 1677 (2013) (describing the use of
predictive coding technology in privilege reviews); Nicholas Barry, Note, Man Versus
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These innovations, however, are not a panacea for addressing the issue.
The problematic drafts in Oracle were produced despite the use of
“electronic scanning mechanisms.” 439 Instead of placing complete
reliance on technology, companies should develop and integrate with that
technology a complementary privilege review process. That process
would likely incorporate audits and other quality control checks to ensure
that drafts do not slip through the proverbial cracks.
D. Provide a Hosted Alternative to Social Networking Sites
[154] Third party access to social media communications involving inhouse lawyers may very well drive companies to ban counsel from using
social networks for business communications. While such a policy could
theoretically address the issue, it would likely be difficult to enforce. 440 In
addition, it may prove unpopular given that many employees, including
lawyers, prefer communicating over social networks. 441
[155] To address these issues, a company may consider deploying an onsite social network environment. 442 Conceptually similar to private clouds
that house data behind the company firewall, an on-site network could be
jointly developed with a third party provider to ensure specific levels of
Machine Review: The Showdown Between Hordes of Discovery Lawyers and a
Computer-Utilizing Predictive-Coding Technology, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 343,
370-71 (2013) (arguing that the use of predictive coding technology in privilege reviews
should satisfy standards of reasonableness under the Federal Rules).
439

Oracle II, C 10-03561, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 121446, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20,
2011).
440

See supra notes 305-11 and accompanying text.

441

See id.

442

See, e.g., Why Chatter?, SALESFORCE, https://www.chatter.com/why/ (last visited Nov.
3, 2013) (discussing the provider’s offering in this regard).
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confidentiality. For example, the company could create specific forums or
groups with limited membership for addressing legal matters or permit
direct messaging with counsel. Under either of these scenarios, employees
would have the benefit of using a social network while the company could
eliminate site representative access to those communications.
E. Ensure the Cloud Provider Has Confidentiality Safeguards
[156] An enterprise that is considering cloud computing for its ESI
storage needs should require that a cloud service provider offers measures
to preserve the confidentiality of privileged messages. As the bar
organization opinions suggest, that may include specific confidentiality
terms or a separate confidentiality agreement. 443 In addition, the provider
should have certain encryption functionality to better preserve
confidentiality. Such functionality—a secure sockets layer connection,
password hashing, encryption key storage—are all designed to prevent
unauthorized access by the provider’s employees (or other third parties) to
company data that is transmitted to and hosted in the cloud. 444 By taking
these measures, counsel and client can better satisfy for themselves that
they have taken “professionally recognized” and “reasonably appropriate
steps” to ensure the confidentiality of their privileged discussions. 445
F. Develop and Enforce a Cogent BYOD Policy
[157] To address the nettlesome confidentiality problems associated with
BYOD, a company should prepare a cogent policy and deploy
443

See supra Part IV.B.3.

444

See Philip Favro, New Tools for Cost-Effective Information Governance, KMWORLD
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.kmworld.com/Articles/White-Paper/Article/New-Tools-forCost-Effective-Information-Governance-77023.aspx (discussing cloud security
considerations for addressing issues surrounding the privilege).
445

See Jacobs & Laurence, supra note 408.
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technologies that facilitate employee compliance. 446 Such a policy
discourages workers from using personal cloud storage providers to
facilitate data transfers or ESI storage. It also delineates the parameters of
access to employee devices by the employee’s family, friends, or
others. 447
[158] To make such a policy more effective, employers will need to
develop a technological architecture that reasonably supports conformity
with the policy. 448 This, in turn, will require the company to provide a
secure portal to ensure that data transmissions between employee devices
and employer databases remain confidential. 449 Whether that gateway is
direct or indirect, it should prevent third parties such as cloud provider
representatives from eavesdropping on privileged communications. To
address the other third party access issue, technologies could be
downloaded to an employee’s personal device to segregate and encrypt
employer information from personal data. Such a measure would
undoubtedly help prevent employee family or friends from accessing
privileged content.
[159] By training employees on the BYOD policy and providing tools to
enable their compliance, companies can better prevent unauthorized
disclosures of counsel’s privileged communications

446

Susan Ross, Unintended Consequences of Bring Your Own Device, LAW TECH. NEWS
(Mar. 7, 2013),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202591156823&th
epage=1 (discussing the role of company policy and potential loss of personal
information stored on a BYOD); see also Hirsch, supra note 420.
447

See, e.g., Milam-Perez, supra, note 421.

448

Day, supra note 411 (discussing the challenges of developing BYOD policies and
infrastructure that can accommodate the variety of consumer operating systems).
449

Id.
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CONCLUSION

[160] There can be little doubt that the protections afforded by the
privilege have been substantially diluted for in-house counsel. Between
the anvil of heightened scrutiny and the hammer of disruptive
technologies, the scope of the privilege has been drastically narrowed over
the past three decades. Nevertheless, there are ways that organizations can
prevent the zone of privilege from shrinking even further. By developing
actionable and defensible corporate policies, providing suitable training to
employees, and using technologies to facilitate compliance, companies
may be able to address some of the corrosive effects of heightened
scrutiny and technology. Only by following these suggestions and other
best practices can clients reasonably expect to counteract these factors that
are narrowing the scope of their internal lawyers’ privilege claims.
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